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By 
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ABSTRACT 
Risk is a very important aspect to consider in the banking sector. The risk model used 
in the developed economies can be very attractive, but very misleading when used in the 
emerging economies. This paper analyzes the need for enterprise risk management (ERM) in 
the banking sector in the emerging economies. Further, it tackles the relationship between 
market and credit risk in emerging economies banking sector. Despite the technical problems, 
such as, the lack of historical data to work with in the emerging economies and the markets 
inefficiency that I faced while doing this paper, this study shows, on a relatively small scale, 
that market and credit risk affects one another, and proves ERM as a very important tool to 
enhance risk measurement and supervision in the banking sector. This paper show that 
despite the fact that not a lot of banks out of my sample crystallize the interaction between 
market and credit risk, still, they point a number of factors contributing to such outcome. The 
results end to an important implication that ERM has to be implemented in the emerging 
economies banking sector, while the current regulatory framework should be changed to 
accommodate the ERM program. 
Keywords: Market Risk; Credit Risk; ERM; Emerging economies; Risk interaction; 
Economic Capital; Risk aggregation; Basel II; Basel III 
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Introduction 
In a world of globalization, measuring risk is crucial for financial success and 
survival. After the 2008’s financial crisis all financial institutions realized that their risk 
measures must be reconsidered. They started, accordingly, to reshape their perspectives of   
risk measurement. They concluded that different factors like credit, liquidity, operational, 
conduct and market risk cannot be measured separately. Furthermore, better resources and 
references proved that market and credit risk are interrelated, thus, the interaction between 
them should be measured in order to improve financial institution risk measurement.  
Rodriguez and Edwards (2009) defined ERM (enterprise risk management) as the 
process of knowledge application to control any divergence from the planned objectives, 
stakeholders’ relationships and shareholders values. Another definition of ERM according to 
Kanchu and Kumar (2013) is the application of a practical tactic to organize, plan, lead, and 
control broad risk variations that are integrated in the organization daily process and long 
term work operations. 
ERM is considered as a vehicle assisting the financial institutions to a better risk 
measurement. This shows the fact that financial institutions are indeed the major units in the 
exercise of risk management. As a result, ERM is going through a revolution it is moving 
from a quantitative control process to a tool for senior management at the highest levels of 
strategy setting and decision making. Senior managers realize that ERM is capable of helping 
with giving the right information about the trade offs of efficient capital development. Also, 
ERM plays a major role in risk-return tradeoffs. However, the road to a fully integrated 
organization with wide risk management and measurement is not an easy one. Meanwhile, 
there are many barriers for ERM application, e.g., technical difficulties in quantifying the risk 
and other several misconceptions that arise through the way (McNish, et al., 2013). 
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The ERM program aims to understand the technological support and value of people 
interaction. It works with people characterized by different levels of knowledge, multiple 
disciplines, and various experiences. The banking world resorts to consultants as a very 
important business development element. However, the cost of information and the 
complications of businesses prove that the problem of measuring risk and how to define it is 
very crucial and challenging. Again, valid action plans must be ready in order to face risk 
threats safely (Rodriguez and Edwards, 2009). Finally, with 2008 financial crisis, these 
concerns were validated and the financial institutions reconsidered how ERM is implemented 
and how it could be most efficient.  
Since ERM main objective is to measure and analyze possible risks that banks are 
subjected to, the main focus of this paper is to show that market and credit risk affect each 
other to highlight the importance of ERM implementation in the emerging economies.  
Drehmann, Sorensen and Stringa (2010), mention that the major two characteristics of a bank 
are to lend on the long term and borrow on the short term. All banks focus on interest rate 
risk which is related to market risk and liquidity risk. Then, they focus on credit risk as an 
important source of capital adequacy. 
According to Jarrow and Turnbull (2000), if a company’s assets change unexpectedly, 
the company’s market value will change accordingly. As a result, market risk will be 
generated, which will impact the probability of default and consequently create a credit risk. 
Also, if the probability of default changes, credit risk will change and it will affect the market 
value of the company. Since market and credit risk cannot be separated, they will impact the 
determination of economic capital (EC), which is a crucial issue to financial regulators. 
Moreover, it impacts the risk adjusted return on capital (RAROC) that is used to measure the 
performance of different activities in a bank. 
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Rodriguez and Edwards (2009) mentioned that ERM implementation is not a static 
process because new risks are always coming up and they need to be analyzed. Therefore, the 
control of risk is a major factor that affects ERM implementation process. Consequently, 
experience, the right information, and constant feedback to the financial institution are 
necessary. The flow of these three factors can be in both directions bottom-up and top-down. 
Nevertheless, ERM effective implementation needs a top-down direction of the above 
mentioned factors and a bottom-up analysis of those factors to recognize risk to be able to 
mitigate it. Bowling and Rieger (2005) see that for a logical plan to set objectives of ERM for 
a bank, a bank must focus on understanding its risk appetite. Hence risk assessment must take 
place first.  
This research is organized as follows. Chapter 1 introduces a literature review survey 
of the overall view of ERM program and why banks are so concerned to implement this 
program to meet the regulations of Basel II and III. The paper also discusses a summary of 
attempts of previous authors who discussed ERM program. Chapter 2 introduces a literature 
review survey on the interaction of market and credit risk and studies this interaction. Chapter 
3 presents the quantitative model described by a set of specific equations to capture if   
market risk and credit risk impact each other, using the data of a group of emerging 
economies banks. Finally, chapter 4 discusses the results and contains the concluding 
remarks.  
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Chapter I: General Overview of ERM 
A.Why Banks need ERM 
The urge towards implementing a successful ERM comes from the fact that financial 
institutions do not want to be downgraded. They want to improve clarity of compliance, 
reliability of data and transparency. However, this is not the only factor, there are other 
important factors related to cultural aspects of risk management and defining the bank’s risk 
appetite. ERM helps management to view risk on a “strategic level” (McNish, et al., 2013).   
Kanchu and Kumar (2013) stated that the role of good management is not only to 
decrease the probability of negative impact on business, but also increase the probability of 
positive factors that would enhance the business operation. According to the “prospect 
theory” model, people have the tendency to accept a risk rather than a sure loss. Since all 
banks suffer from market, credit, liquidity and operational risks they should focus on how to 
simultaneously manage them.  
Corporate governance is very crucial for businesses success. The framework where 
corporate governance is applied must include ERM as a principle component. In order to 
have an effective risk measures and monitor risks regularly, ERM program must be applied in 
a way that top management, along with the rest of senior and junior stuff, should understand 
that ERM program is a comprehensive process that describes how to manage risk. (Bowling 
and Rieger, 2005)  
Despite the fact that the key business line for banks is accepting deposits on one hand 
and lend on the other hand; banks have expanded into different areas such as, trading, 
investment banking, mutual funds, insurance or brokerage. As a result of this shift, the 
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exposure of banks to the risk of financial markets has increased. (Aaron, Armstrong and 
Zelmer, 2007) 
Banks also are exposed to many types of risks that they have to bear in order to 
generate profits. Due to the developed business strategies and the complexity of those risks 
along with international market pressures, the methods and tools to measure and account for 
risk are different. That is why ERM model is developed and it is very critical for banks’ 
integrated risk mitigation. According to Aaron, Armstrong and Zelmer (2007), nowadays, the 
complex nature of financial markets, the complexity of the legal documentation required to 
record the transactions, along with the use of information technology altogether, led to the 
development of quantitative models to capture risk. The ERM program considers both, 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, in managing and identifying risk.  
Banks recognize the need for ERM program also because a successful corporate 
governance system will lead to gain the confidence of the regulators along with stakeholders. 
Moreover, it will help with controlling the costs of risk management. ERM can benefit a bank 
because it requires the efficient communication within the bank that will lead to a better 
recognition and understanding of various types of risk. As a result, the bank’s overall risk 
will be minimized, yielding a lower cost of capital. Lower cost of capital is one of ERM long 
term benefits leading to a sustained growth. (Bowling and Rieger, 2005) 
B. ERM under Basel II and III 
In 2006, Basel II was published. It had three-pillar approach to capital and risk 
management for banks. Pillar 1, has processes, definitions and equations to calculate the 
“minimum regulatory capital requirements”. Pillar 2, elaborates the obligatory processes for 
both regulators and banks to fulfill the requirements of “capital adequacy”. Pillar 3 requires 
banks to transparently disclose necessary information to the public and the investors. Prior to 
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the economic crisis, banks and regulators focused on the implementation of pillar 1. 
However, after the crisis the focus on pillar 1 became costly, mainly because it did not take 
into consideration risks such as, liquidity risk, business risk, and reputational risk. As a result, 
Basel III was introduced to improve pillar 1 by adding new funding, capital and liquidity 
requirements. (Pfetsch et al., 2011) 
 
Figure (1): Basel III: An enhancement of Basel II by Moody’s Analytics 
Chabanel (2011) argued that Basel III offers a framework that covers all business 
risks, as a prelude to the implementation of the ERM. Basel III changes the bank’s 
perspective as how to address finance and risk management.  It also requires an integrated 
framework between risk and finance management. But, the implementation process of Basel 
III can be slowed down by the existence of multiple silos and the separation between who 
manages risk and who is responsible for finance. It requires the bank to change its 
organizational structure of finance management and introduce a new framework for risk 
management. 
Basel III put banks under pressure to have a comprehensive ERM plan. The Savings 
and Loans Associations crisis in the 70s along with the Asian crisis in 90s increased the risk 
awareness in the banking industry. Accordingly, the demand for international standards of 
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supervision of the banking system increased. This has contributed to the introduction of the 
“Basel Committee of Banking Supervision” under the sponsorship of the “Bank for 
International Settlement” in Basel.  Banking regulation revolves around a simple idea which 
is “capital charge”. After all, banks should quantify their risks and maintain an adequate 
capital amount to create a cushion to absorb those risks. (Böcker & Klüppelberg, 2008) 
Basel III requires a well developed ERM system efficiently applied to implement 
Basel III. Also, Basel III is concerned with “supervisory monitoring” and “global liquidity 
standard”. Under Basel III the “liquidity coverage ratio” requires banks to have highly liquid 
assets that can endure a 30 day stressed funding situation. Additionally, Basel III stipulates 
that banks should have “net stable funding ratio” that covers the weighted sum of the bank’s 
entire asset side on the balance sheet, which is designed to deal with the mismatches from 
liquidity. Hence, “Net stable funding ratio” main purpose is to encourage banks to use stable 
funding resources. Moreover, “Supervisory monitoring” under liquidity structure in Basel III 
have a universal set of monitoring criteria that helps the supervisors to analyze and identify 
the trends arising from liquidity risk at the bank level and “system-wide” level. (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision reforms-Basel III. n.d.) 
According to Basel Committee (2010), in Basel III, “risk coverage” is very important, 
especially after 2007 financial crisis. Basel III necessitates the capital base level and quality 
to rise up; also it ensures that all risks must be captured in the framework of capital. The 
reason for this is that the failure of banks to “capture major on- and off-balance sheet risks” 
was a major factor that drastically amplified the financial crisis. Chabanel (2011) pointed that 
some countries prefer to have a fresh start and implement the new package with its new rules 
away from the old system. Russia is an example. They announced that by 2015 they will shift 
from the standardized approach to calculating credit risk to internal ratings based (IRB).  
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Basel III qualitative impact on both banks and financial institutions is summarized 
below followed by Basel II breakdown proposal: 
Table 1 A summary of qualitative impact s of the proposals by KPMG 2011 
 
 
Figure (2): Breakdown of the Basel III proposals by KPMG. 
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According to Pfetsch et al. (2011), due to the complex nature of Basel III, financial 
institutions; especially banks, are willing to change their perspective in guiding the bank 
work operation. They are shifting away from a strict economic perspective to a regulatory 
one. However, this can weaken the management of risk. The Internal Capital Adequacy 
Process (ICAP) benefits are obvious; it helps the bank’s management in setting clear 
principles in the calculation of capital. As a result, this will help the bank to overcome the 
problem of strict regulatory standpoint. Having a strong ICAP can help the bank to have a 
competitive edge in improving the measurement of “risk-adjusted” performance. Since the 
current financial environment suffers from tight capital, having a well implemented ICAP 
will help the bank to efficiently use its resources.   
As long as not all countries have shifted from Basel II to Basel III, banks will face 
some global complexity. This is because a bank may need to manage risk in different 
jurisdictions that have different regulations. For example, a bank may have to report under 
Basel III in one country and under Basel II in another. This depends on where the bank parent 
country is located. Another factor to be considered when implementing Basel III is data 
management. Data management is an important factor for a successful ERM as well.  The 
finance and risk teams must work together and they both must have an easy and quick access 
to clear, accurate and centralized data. The data must reflect the bank’s market, credit, 
operation and liquidity risk. In order to meet Basel III requirements the data must be 
consistent and up to date. It will be very costly if data is dispersed among different silos 
because it will be very difficult to define, collect and manage the data from the different bank 
units. The quality of the data and its availability at the right time represents an essential factor 
that can decide the success or the failure of the Basel III application. This can be easily done 
through an efficient ERM framework. (Chabanel, 2011) 
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Under Basel III pillar 1”risk coverage”, a significant amount of higher capital level is 
needed for derivatives activities and trading. Under pillar 2 “risk management and 
supervision”, banks address risk management and company-wide governance. They are 
required to manage risk concentrations, capture the risk of securitization activities and “off-
balance sheet exposures”. Also, they are required to have effective compensation practices 
and value those practices, give incentive to better risk management and returns over the long 
run, they should also have strong corporate governance, apply stress testing,  and have 
“accounting standards for their financial tools. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
reforms-Basel III. n.d.) 
Pfetsch et al. (2011) proclaim that after the financial crisis, regulators proved that the 
Value at Risk (VAR) is of a limited use as it did not predict the great volatility. Moreover, 
VAR did not account for some risk types such as, market-liquidity risk and basis risk. 
However, this does not mean that the model based approach is no longer of use. It only gives 
a sign that both, regulators and banks, should enhance it with simple, transparent and 
effective management process. Some risks are only to be quantified.  
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Figure (3): Capital Demand: Risks included in bank’s economic-risk models by Micknsey Report Number 27 
Regardless of the bank’s starting point, Basel III implementation is quite challenging. 
The main challenge is the absence of a definite plan to ensure successful implementation. 
Also, the constant need for detailed, accurate and up to date data is a very difficult task. 
Moreover, coordinating between finance and risk management is not an easy task. There are 
two approaches where a bank can apply Basel III, first “enhancing the current environment” 
and second approach is “deploying a new regulatory environment”.  There is no rule of which 
is a better approach. Finally, each approach success depends on the bank performance and its 
current stability in its existing environment. (Chabanel, 2011) 
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Table 2: Options and considerations when implementing Basel III. 
 
Options and considerations when implementing Basel III. 
Note. Retrieved from Implementing Basel III: Challenges, Options & Opportunities by Moody’s Analytics 
C.The Core Challenges of ERM Implentation 
Grant Thornton (2013), believed that ERM was a compliance motivated task and 
regulatory process led by quantitative measurements. But nowadays this is no longer the case. 
ERM is an active element of a top-down business plan. According to Basel III banks must 
review and assess their risk frameworks. The control of the requirements of this framework is 
a challenge for banks to apply.  
According to Grant Thornton (2013), there are four main challenges that are 
highlighted frequently in implementing ERM in banks.These challenges are: 
• Culture, risk ownership, and appetite 
• Risk processes 
• Risk transparency 
• Risk governance 
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First challenge is culture, risk ownership, and appetite. The main challenge is in 
embedding a companywide risk appetite in an environment that is not tangible and in 
allocating the risk ownership. Also, it is difficult to integrate qualitative and quantitative 
risks. The solution for this kind of challenge is for the bank to define what risk aware 
business plan is to its employees and capture and measure the qualitative risk. Over and 
above, they should allocate the available resources according to its risk profiles. In addition, 
they should take into account the possible future risk.  The most important thing to do is to 
set in a common plan among the entire bank for the risk language they use. This will facilitate 
the work process  and make it more efficient among all departments.  
Moreover, Bowling and Rieger (2005) mentioned that the bank must make sure that 
they have the stamina to start implementing ERM. Since ERM is a long journey and takes 
time, the bank with highly experience chief risk officer (CRO) will be able to start correctly 
and succeed in the implementation process. Whereas an inexperienced CRO that tries to do a 
lot in a very short time will fail, because ERM needs to be rooted deeply to be able to grow.   
Second challenge is risk processes. In everyday business operations, it’s difficult to 
control risk related processes. As a result, the determination of risk reward impact on the 
business daily operations and strategic decisions is difficult. One of the solutions is to 
regularly monitor work process and clearly communicate and document the standardized 
work operations. Another suggestion is to create a tangible process control through all 
business operations that can be traceable at every stage. 
Third challenge is risk transparency. It’s difficult to link between future risk 
assessment and quantifying the possible risks and communicating and categorizing intangible 
risks. This challenge can be solved through the application of an “intelligent rating 
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methodologies” and creating a complete stress testing. Also, the bank’s management should 
constantly go through the shortcomings they face.    
Final challenge is risk governance. The main challenge here is to create a structure 
that governs and includes a mutual understanding of the variations between group and 
divisional risk formation. The bank can overcome this through creating a governance model 
of a top-down risk approach along with the implementation of ERM program that includes all 
of the bank departments.  
However, these are not the only challenges that can face a bank. According to 
Bowling and Rieger (2005), the C-suit officers are very important. They are the top 
management need to support ERM along with CRO. Constant discussions should take place 
about how they used to measure risk and what will differ now through implementing ERM. 
Each bank is unique and has its own internal environment that ERM needs to be built around. 
ERM must be designed in a way to suit the needs of the bank and its stakeholders. The 
communication of ERM throughout the bank is very important because blind spots can cause 
ERM to fail. 
Another possible challenge is the size of the bank and the available resources. If the 
bank is small and the CRO does not have a team that can support ERM implementation and 
transfer it to the rest of the department a problem will be created. Other banks that do not 
even have a CRO will be in need to hire a consultant team to assist the bank in the initial 
implementation of ERM and train the staff to fully implement it. 
D.The Framework for ERM 
There are several ways to transmit the scope of ERM framework that has been defined 
over the past few years. However, regulators did not specify a certain framework that banks 
can use. The focus of banks is how they treat their clients and customers and the level of 
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capital they are required to hold. Therefore, their framework must focus on those elements. 
But the ability to create ERM culture within the risk they face along with the nature of their 
daily operations and their concern about how they treat their clients and the level of capital 
they hold is still under investigation. (Grant Thornton, 2013) 
According to Grant Thornton (2013) figure 4 illustrates how risk can be coordinated. 
For risk to be efficiently coordinated four steps are needed: 
• First, to identify and evaluate the criteria that is used to evaluate risk consistently. 
• Second, to manage the risk in the scope of the bank’s business strategy and daily 
operations. 
• Third, to constantly communicate and report risks faced by the bank within bank’s 
different departments.  
• Fourth, to constantly monitor risk management and evaluation to ensure smooth and 
efficient risk coordination between the bank’s departments.  
However, to be able to implement those four steps, the bank must have seven main pillars 
(explained in figure 4) on which efficient risk coordination is based: 
• Risk governance. 
• Risk strategy. 
• Risk appetite. 
• Define and communicate risk policies. 
• Periodic evaluations. 
• Structure. 
• Execution and milestones. 
16 
 
Figure (4): Risk Management Framework 
GrantThornton (2013) suggested that a holistic ERM framework in the banking sector 
is very important. When a bank assesses the existing ERM framework, it is very important to 
regard all risks that banks face as interdependent. The fundamental components of ERM 
framework recent trends show that the focus has increased on the importance of culture and 
governance. They  focused on transparency as well, especially on the need to assess the 
information that management provides, both quantitative and qualitative, to build an accurate 
risk profile.  The following table shows the risk management fundamentals and their 
objectives along with deliverables. 
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Table 3: Risk Management Fundamentals objectives and deliverables. 
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Risk Management Fundamentals objectives and deliverables. 
Note. Retrieved from Banking Risk Enhancing your enterprise-wide risk management framework by the Grant 
Thornton.  
As Shown in table 3, a top down approach  assesses the ERM that a bank can follow 
based on qualitative approach. The idea behind it is to create a framework for ERM and a 
benchmark map that compares the evaluation of ERM with different groups within a bank’s 
different departments. (McNish et al. , 2013)   
McNish et al. (2013) stated that governance and risk organization is important 
because it illustrates where the responsibility for risk management finally lies. Moreover, it 
shows how a financial institution allocates responsibilities “vertically”, which is related to 
risk decision making. They mentioned that a lot of institutions have CROs who implement 
strong corporate governance regarding the risk. However, the main problem lies in the board 
level where there is a lot of variation in the “cascade of risk governance” from one institution 
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to another, specifically, regarding the governance structure that should be aligned between 
business units and board level. They suggest that this can be solved through good practices 
that they witnessed. One suggestion was to develop stress scenarios by the board and year to 
year approval of the business plan. Another was flexible management concepts can be 
applied to risk in order to create ERM function.  
ERM implementation requires an exercise of information technology (IT) that can 
create a system for different risk processes. It will also help the employees with organizing 
their knowledge and efforts, thus, producing efficient results in risk management. IT covers a 
wide spectrum of functions by creating simple communication channels between different 
departments and generating the capacity to support knowledge sharing . This will bridge 
between blind areas among the deparments,facilitating the measurement and analysis of risk 
accurately. (Rodriguez and Edwards, 2009)  
E.Factors that help with ERM Success 
One of the most crucial factors in the success of ERM implementation is to focus on 
business objective and strategy. It is very essential not to look at risk from a narrow 
perspective. One of the bank unbreakable risks is not meeting the overall objective. At the 
first level, ERM focuses on the bank’s objective and strategy. The recognition of the basic 
objective helps employees at all levels to know whether their decisions and actions are 
affecting the objectives positively or negatively. It forces the managers to see risks in a broad 
level and how their decisions affect the returns and how risk may affect specific departments 
in the bank more than others. (Bowling and Rieger, 2005) 
As previously mentioned, banks should not perceive risk from a narrow perspective. 
They must be able to see the full picture. Bowling and Rieger (2005) emphasized that ERM 
should follow this broad picture and build its plan upon it. Silo approach is no longer of 
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value. The external factors that affect the risk and its nature help with managing it. Some 
risks are not valued, or managed, correctly because of short sighted view and the lack of 
interconnection between the nature of risk and, both, internal and external factors that are 
affecting it.   
F.Risk Management Process 
For a bank to operate efficiently, it needs to manage all types of risks. Risk 
management main function is to identify and control potential risk and minimize these risks 
to a possible manageable level. Kanchu and Kumar (2013) believe that the main goal of 
management is to maximize the bank shareholders’ profits and to ensure long term solvency 
through optimizing capital funds. 
Bowling and Rieger (2005) illustrated a generic and a simple risk management 
process: It starts by analyzing the risks facing an organization, followed by finding a strategy 
that suits the nature of these risks and the factors affecting them. Then, implement the 
developed strategy, and finally monitor its progress and observe how effective is it.    
Another detailed risk management process includes six steps. It begins by identifying 
the origin of the risk in the bank, there are three types of risk within a bank, market, credit 
and operational. Second, comes the identification, understanding and analysis of those risks. 
Third step is the assessment and measurement of risk, where the management assesses the 
impact of the risk and then measures it. Fourth step is to develop the risk control 
recommendations in cooperation with risk officers who are competent to deal with those 
risks. Fifth step is monitoring the risk and supervising any new development accompanied by 
a constant reporting of the current progress. Final step is the tradeoff between the risk and 
return and balancing between them. (Kanchu and Kumar, 2013) 
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G.Risk Management Techniques 
According to Kanchu and Kumar (2013), there are different techniques when it comes 
to managing risk. However, we will discuss four of them. First technique is “Risk Adjusted 
Rate of Return on Capital” (RAROC). It is a tool that allows managers to make the right 
decision when balancing the tradeoff between risk and return. It relies on an economic basis 
and gives a measure of all bank relevant risks. Since the availability of economic capital 
protects banks against certain losses, it is very important to allocate this capital among 
different risks. RAROC analysis shows how much economic capital a bank needs to run its 
operations and determines the bank total return. It can be used to know how much capital is 
allocated to market, operational and credit risks. Also it is used as an integrated risk tool by 
management.  
The second technique is GAP analysis, which is an interest rate tool. It gives an idea 
about how variation in interest rate affects net income. This tecnique is based on  the balance 
sheet and mainly focuses on net interest income possible variability over a specific time 
horizon. This method uses a schedule that distributes the interest sensitive liabilities, off-
balance sheet position and assets into specific time frames according to their time remaining 
to their next re-pricing if it uses floating rate or maturity if the rate is fixed. So basically this 
schedule is made up of re-pricing and maturities combined. Then, these schedules generate 
certain indicator of economic value and earnings that are interest rate sensitive. The liabilities 
and assets that can be re-priced are called “Rate sensitive liabilities” (RSLs) and “Rate 
sensitive assets” (RSAs), respectively. The gap between the RSAs and RSLs is called 
“Interest sensitive gap” (DGAP).  The GAP will be positive in the future, if the increase in 
the interest rate leads to an increase in net interest income as well. This is due to the fact that 
the change in the interest expense is smaller than that in interest income. (Kanchu and 
Kumar, 2013) 
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Third technique is Duration Gap analysis. This method takes into consideration all 
cash outflows and inflows to manage the net interest income. Duration represents two 
factors,it presents the time weighted and value measure of the maturity of all cash flows and 
how much time is needed on average to recover the invested funds. As a result, duration can 
be considered as market elasticity of an instrument to a change in interest rate. (Kanchu and 
Kumar, 2013) 
Fourth and last technique is Value at Risk (VaR). This technique gives a probability 
for a maximum amount a firm can lose, or gain, over a certain period of time. However, VaR 
measures the overall risk including equities, foreign currency and commodities. (Kanchu and 
Kumar, 2013) 
H.Examples for Previous Attempts to Implement and Understand what can 
Impact ERM 
Grant Thornton (2013) gave examples on helping previous clients to improve their 
ERM framework. One example is UK clearing bank. The main problem was the management 
and control framework of the market risk. The challenge was the management uncertainty 
about the shortcomings of the market risk monitoring and reporting. The UK clearing bank 
main concern was the concentration limits for reporting and monitoring market riskthat were 
set and trading and how it is monitored and communicated to provide a sufficient defense. 
Grant Thornton helped through setting a clear definition of accountability for control and 
ownership. Grant Thornton also helped in reporting market risk and monitoring it, along with 
the set of regulatory requirements. This was done by consolidating the core set of data 
sources used to supply a specific user control panel.  Moreover, Grant Thornton implanted 
certain parameters by which indicators of market risk can be effectively, formally and 
systematically questioned, using, mainly anddesk specific data. 
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Rodriguez and Edwards (2009) attempted to analyze the risk modeling process using 
knowledge management (KM) principles. Their pilot results showed that the sharing quality 
of risk knowledge was associated with ERM implementation perceived value. However, 
when they tested this hypothesis it was rejected. Another study for Rodriguez and Edwards 
(2009) based on ERM and KM theoretical framework mentioned that the problem of risk 
management is not the lack of information; but instead, it lies in how to interpret them.  
Rodriguez and Edwards (2009) identified five different variables and created five 
hypotheses where those variables can impact the perceived value of the ERM implementation 
in organizations. These hypotheses were: 
• H1: Network capacity for connecting 
• H2: Perceived quality of risk knowledge 
• H3: Perceived quality of communication among groups 
• H4: Risk management information systems functionality 
• H5: Perceived value of information systems integration 
Their results showed that none of the above hypotheses was supported. They vouched 
that variables representing IT had less impact on ERM implementation than variables 
representing people interaction. The most important variable that had impact on the perceived 
value of ERM implementation was quality of communication among groups. This proves that 
work environment, business meetings, and working in teams enhance ERM implementation. 
Being able to exchange information and ideas between one another at work creates value to 
ERM implementation. Reaching common conclusions leads to better decision making that 
also improves ERM implementation.   
Finally, it is important to know that there is no single model for ERM that can be 
globally accepted. The way an institution structures ERM depends on the diagnostic table 
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mentioned in section D. It all depends on the management ability on how they manage risk 
and their available resources. An institution must understand and highlight all risk 
management difficulties that can hinder ERM implementation.  
ERM successful implementation relies on a common risk language that is used in 
banks. This language is crucial and very beneficial in having more transparency and 
identifying the bank position among other competitors. Banks must create recommendations 
on a periodic basis by setting clear goals to help them implement ERM plan successfully and 
efficiently. However, banks must bear in mind that tradeoffs will be made constantly 
depending on the business plan they are following. 
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Chapter II: Market and Credit Risk Analysis 
A.Market and Credit Risk definitions 
According to Hartmann (2010), market risk is defined as the movement in the market 
prices (expected or actual), such as, exchange rate, interest rate, or equity prices, that create 
losses or gains on the portfolio, or on the value of a position.  On the other hand, credit risk is 
defined as the actual or expected fulfillment (or failure to fulfill) of “contractual obligations”, 
such as, the repayment of principal amounts, payment of coupon on bonds, or of the interest 
on loans.    
According to Breuer et al. (2008), market risk  is  the risk that a financial position 
may change in value “due to the change of an underlying market risk factor, like a stock 
price, an exchange rate, or an interest rate”; while credit risk is “the risk of not receiving the 
promised payment on an outstanding claim”. 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) defined credit risk through developing an alternative 
variable to measure the bank’s unexpected loan default ratio. This ratio represents the net 
losses in the present period to “allowances for these loan losses recorded” in the period 
before it. The variable they created captures the banks’ loan portfolios’ existing risk 
possibility, and how accurately the risk management of the bank is to expect the “near term 
loan losses”. (p.243) 
Fiori and Lannotti (2010) defined credit risk as “the ratio of the number of new 
borrowers defaulting to the number of performing borrowers”. While they defined factor of 
the market risk as the “Italian equity stock index and returns and their realized volatilities, 
characteristic of the euro-area yield curve, price earnings ratio of the Italian stock market 
index, equity-market risk premium, Fama and French factors”.  
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Aaron, Armstrong and Zelmer (2007) recognized market risk as the possibility for 
unfavourable changes in liabilities, prices or financial assets to occur. On the other hand, they 
defined credit risk as the possibility of losing if a debtor did not meet his obligation on its due 
date.  
Htay and Salman (2013), refered to credit risk as the defaults in either investments or 
financing services. While market risk is the systematic risk that takes place when there are 
changes in the “market prices of investment portfolio assets of the bank” (p.52). Market risk 
can impact bank’s profitability if its investments incur a loss or yield a lower return.  Hence, 
the wealth of shareholders will be affected. Banks should ensure the diversification of their 
investments so they can guarantee their portfolios ability to yield the maximum profit. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) defined credit risk as “the non-
delivery of a contractual obligation by the obligor’s counterparty”. Referring to the market 
risk, they defined it “as fluctuations in value (or expectations about future fluctuations) 
related to changes in relative prices (such as exchange rates, commodity prices, etc), in the 
discount factor (i.e. interest rates and risk premia), or in the level of cash flows, which are not 
nominally pre-determined by contract”. (p. 5 & 6) 
B. Market and Credit Risk Interaction 
Questions have been raised regarding the approaches used to deal with market and 
credit risk separately. These questions stem from the credit risk development and the transfer 
of risk from one market to another. Therefore, managers should not ignore the risk resulting 
from the integration of market and credit risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2009). According to Alessandri and Drehmann (2010), second after credit risk, interest rate 
risk became very important to consider while calculating the economic capital for a bank. 
Since there is no “economic capital model” that integrates both risks, regulators usually 
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analyze each risk independently then add them together. However, this is very critical 
because the literature supports the idea that both risks interact through different channels, 
“interest rate risk derive credit risk”. (p. 730) 
 The approach used to quantify a comprehensive risk measure is to aggregate many 
risk types and take into account their correlation. Until this moment two approaches have 
been developed; the bottom-up approach and the top-down approach. The bottom-up builds 
models where they take into account the similar risk drivers and their interactions (Fiori & 
Lannotti, 2010).  According to Grundke (2008), the bottom-up approach use the risk factors 
related to the individual risk instruments and model the interaction between them. Then by 
using one common framework, this approach measures the needed amount of economic 
capital for “different risk types”, while accounting for stochastic dependencies between risk 
factors. Therefore, they did not find a need to aggregate the losses from specific risks by 
copulas. Copulas are tools that are used to model the interdependence between more than one 
variable (even if they do not have the same statistical disturbution). Copulas were first 
introduced by Sklar in 1959. It is derived from a latin word that means to join or to connect 
(Schmidt, 2006). As for the top-down approach, it builds models where the individual risk’s 
marginal distribution are calculated separately then added; either through a very advanced 
approach of the copula or variance covariance matrix. (Fiori & Lannotti, 2010) 
The accuracy of a bank capturing the overall risk exposure highly depends on the way 
the bank aggregates the credit and market risks. In fact, if the two risks are not considered in 
an integrated perspective, the “bottom-up” approach, that starts at an individual instrument 
level and then measures the overall risk exposure on  the final risk estimates, will be biased.  
The old “top-down” approach, where each risk is analyzed in a separate silo then aggregated 
together, is no longer valid. That is because it ignores the fact that there can be a non-liner 
relationship between the two risks.  When each risk is calculated alone, then the results are 
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summed up, the overall risk depends on whether the changes in the portfolio value is derived 
from credit or market risk. As mentioned above, since the relationship can be non-linear, the 
interaction of both risks can lead to a harmful compounding risk as the risk of the portfolio 
will not be less than the sum of the individual risk exposures (unlike the case of linear 
relationship). Accordingly, the total risk can be over or under estimated. (Hartmann, 2010)  
Some authors presented some cases of foreign currency loans that are relevant to the 
above discussion in Austria, Italy, France, Switzerland, United States, and Germany. These 
authors measured default risk and exchange rate separately and added them up. The result 
was that the actual level of risk was under- estimated. For example, a B+ rated obligator, 
using an integrated method of measuring the two risks, lead to an overall risk of 1.5 to 7.5 
times more than the overall risk derived from measuring each risk separately and then adding 
them. (Hartmann, 2010) 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) argued that the non linear 
relationship between market and credit risk interaction appears when the default losses on a 
financial instrument relies on the changes in market risk factors. In this case, both market and 
credit risk are inevitably integrated and any trial to measure them separately will lead to huge 
biases in the overall risk. Alessandri and Drehmann (2010) also stated that “integrated 
economic capital” will always be higher than the “simple economic capital” due to the 
complex non-linear interaction between credit and market risk. Therefore, a joint analysis of 
this interaction is required for an accurate capital level estimation. (p. 731) 
According to Grundke (2005), one of the banking industry credit portfolio models’ 
limitations is that they did not account for the stochastic modelling of risk factors, such as 
credit spreads and risk-free interest rates, throughout the course of re-valuation of the risk 
horizon. For instance, loans and bonds are re-valued using the existing “forward rates for 
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discounting future cash flows”.  Consequently, they ignored the stochastic nature of credit 
spreads and risk free interest rates. This can lead to an underestimation of how risky the 
credit portfolio could be. Moreover, there is a correlation between the changes in the factors 
related to market risk and changes in debtors credit quality, therefore, the integration of the 
exposure at default into the credit portfolio model is not feasible. Also the correlation 
between the “exposure at default of different instruments” (which relies on correlated or 
identical factors of market risk) cannot be modelled.  
Tang and Yan (2010) stated that the structural traditional models based on Merton’s 
(1974) work are no longer acceptable as they ignored the interaction between credit and 
market risk. Some empirical studies have focused on the use of the average yield spreads of a 
specific rating category or corporate bonds indices yield spread in order to study the credit 
spread dynamics. However, this approach ignores the heterogeneity of the firm. As a result, 
the expected losses are underestimated. Others found that using the aggregate credit spreads, 
the macroeconomic variables explained a lot of the variations that take place over a period of 
time. When the authors used a panel regression to study this relation between the aggregate 
credit spread and macroeconomic variables, they found that the bulk of the explanatory 
power of determining the default risk comes from the firm’s characteristics. They also found 
that macroeconomic variables have a lot of the explanatory power (as the structural model 
implies). Moreover, they confirmed that as the firm’s cash flow volatility and growth rate of 
cash flow increases, the credit spread decreases.  
Derhmann, Sorensen, and Stringa (2010), stated that a simple risk tool to manage the 
interest rate risk and measure, is  using gap analysis, where a regulator or a bank evaluates 
the interest rate risk by examining the net re-pricing mismatch between off balance sheet 
items, liabilities, and assets.  However, there are many problems in using this method because 
the authors implicitly assume that any shocks to the “risk free yield curve” will have no 
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impact on the “credit quality of assets” (p.714). There are a few models that have been 
developed to try to measure the interaction of credit and market risk together. Most of the 
models focus on the shock impact on assets without considering the re-pricing characteristics 
and the liabilities of the entire portfolio.  
Jobst, Mitra and Zenios (2006) stated that the diversification of market risk is very 
different from credit risk, which makes it difficult to build a model to measure the interaction 
between the two risks. Using standard deviation to measure the default risk does not give any 
statement about the severity of losses at a "certain percentile of the return/loss distribution" 
(p.718 & 719). Such approach just reduces the standard deviation aiming at reducing the 
probability of a crisis as well. So, given the nature of credit risk using conditional value at 
risk (CVaR) is more suitable. Krokhmal,  Palmquist, and Uryasev  (2001) defined the CVaR 
as the “conditonal expected loss under the condition that it exceeds VaR”. Meaning that it 
measures the expected losses further beyond the VaR.  It is also known as the Expected 
Shortfall. Simple CVaR is a better measure for risk than the VaR, but its quite similar in 
concept.  
According to Breuer et al. (2008), there are main four channels which credit and 
market risk interact. These channels are: 
• The exposure at default (EAD). 
• The probability of default (PD). 
• Default correlations. 
• The loss given default (LGD). 
The EAD may rely on market prices. The outstanding loan discounted value relies on 
the interest rate at which future instalments are discounted. Its value will depend on the 
exchange rate if it is a foreign currency loan.  The PD may rely on market prices. Payment 
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commitments often depend on market prices such as, commodity prices, interest rates, or 
exchange rates. (Breuer et al., 2008) 
Wong and Hui (2009), studied the interaction between credit and market risk in banks 
through a liquidity stress testing, where default risk and liquidity can arise from the 
“crystallization” of the market risk that stems from an extended period of “negative 
exogenous asset price shocks” (p.3). These shocks increase the bank’s liquidity risk through 
three channels: 
• During shocks the ability to gain liquidity from sales of assets decrease. 
• In an environment of financial stress, the probability of draw downs on the bank’s 
irrevocable commitments increase, the bank is therefore exposed to “contingent 
liquidity risk”.     
• Drastic market to market (MTM) losses on the assets of a bank increase its default 
risk.Consequently, deposits outflow increase significantly. 
As mentioned earlier, market and credit risks are defined differently. However, since 
the same economic factors affect both risks, the differences should not be overstated. This is 
why it is very difficult to differentiate between them in management and measurement. 
Despite the fact that some factors are specific to each risk type, these factors interact in risk 
management, measurement and determining asset values. Thus, this interaction should be 
considered. (Hartmann, 2010) 
Breuer et al. (2008), stated that when the market and credit risk are each calculated 
separately, the total economic capital is calculated by adding capital for each risk. They 
argued that if a portfolio position relies on both credit and market risk factors, adding capital 
for each risk (after calculating them separately) will only be accurate if the portfolio’s value 
is separated into a credit and market sub-portfolios. However, if the value of the portfolio 
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depends on both risks and separation is not an option, there can be significant quantitative 
compounding effects.   
According to Fiori and Lannotti (2010), calculating EC through the risk silo approach 
gives the benefits of diversification high value.Notably, Alexandre and Pezier (2003) used a 
“normal copula” to credit and market risk factors through their marginal distribution. Their 
findings show that negative correlation among risk factors benefits the overall estimation of 
economic capital. Also, Rosenberg and Schermann (2006) used the copula approach to the 
“marginal distribution of the aggregated risk factors”, and their findings show that the silo 
adding approach overestimates risk by more than 40%. On the other hand, if they assumed 
“joint normality” the risk will be underestimated by the same amount of 40%.  (As cited in 
Fiori & lannotti, 2010, p. 7) 
Barnhill and Maxwell (2002) argued that credit spreads, risk free term structure, 
equity market indices and foreign exchange rates are all correlated. By applying Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM), they subtract each firm’s return on equity from the return on the 
market index. Then each firm equity return is used to calculate the firm’s debt ratio. By 
knowing the credit rating of each firm within a defined risk horizon, the proper interest rate 
(i.e. is a risk adjusted term) is used to discount the future cash flow of the coupon bond that 
the firm issues. But Barnhill and Maxwell (2002) did not examine to what degree the impact 
of the additional “integrated market risk factors” relies on a definite mode specification. (As 
cited in Grundke, 2005, p.64) 
Fiori and Lannotti (2010) stated that the Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive 
(FAVAR) approach is used to measure risk interaction and its aggregation. Factor model 
derives its information from a “large cross sectional data set”.  Factor models, combined 
along with VAR, form a larger data set  available to study the impact of macroeconomic 
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variables on the monetary policy. They argued that the FAVAR approach is strong, as it is 
capable of using small number of observations to analyze the interaction among a large 
number of financial and macroeconomic time series. 
 Empirically, FAVAR has been used to analyze the real economy and financial market 
interaction. This analysis is done through studying the dynamics of the yield curve. Monch 
(2008) argued that yield curves are used because they are derived from the expected future 
inflation and future short term interest rates. As a result, the macroeconomic shocks 
information is able to explain the yield curve and to derive the market risk. Gilchirst, Yankov 
and Zakrajsek (2009), stated that FAVAR has been used to know the expected “information 
content of credit market spreads for future economic activity". (As cited in Fiori & Lannotti, 
2010, p.8) 
Hillebrand and Bocker (2008) studied the interaction between credit and market risk 
through combining linear factor model for market risk, and Merton-like factor model for 
credit risk. A set of macroeconomic factors Y = (Y1, . . . , YK) derives both models, "where  
the factor weights are allowed to be zero, so that a risk type may only depend on a subset of 
Y". Their model approach allowed "to derive closed-form expressions for inter-risk 
correlation in the case of normally distributed and heavy-tailed risk factors; thus, providing 
valuable insight into inter-risk dependence of a credit risk portfolio in general". They gave 
the inter-risk correlation upper bounds, which relies only on a "typical credit portfolio 
characteristics", such as rating structure and asset correlation. (p.2)  
Jarrow and Turnbull (2000), stated that Kealhofer, McQuown and Vasicek (KMV) 
methodology has several advantages for the management of credit risk. This method takes 
into account the market information on the probability of default, through estimating the 
volatility of the firm, based on the equity market value. The estimates created are not highly 
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dependent on the assumptions of the distribution used, because there is a “graph relating the 
distance to default with respect to the observed default frequency” (p.273). However, there 
are also many problems to the KMV methodology. Most of the key inputs of the model are 
not directly observed, such as the expected value of the rate of return and volatility on the 
firm’s assets.  Additionally, the data used to estimate the frequency of the expected default 
are historical, and it is assumed that the data is stationary. The stationary assumption is not 
valid in the real life cases. Therefore, the KMV underestimates the real default probability.  
According to Tang and Yan (2010), there are few previous studies that show the 
impact of macroeconomic conditions on the credit spreads. The analysis of those studies 
show that the macroeconomic variables have a significant impact on the credit spreads. The 
analysis showed that “credit spreads are countercyclical”, which in turn shows a “negative 
correlation” between the credit spread and interest rate. The use of structural models explains 
this clearly through the fact that the firm cash flow growth rate increases with the increase in 
the economic growth.  Keeping everything constant, as the economic growth rate increases 
the growth rate of the firm will increase, which in return will decrease the credit spread and 
the probability of default. Moreover, as the volatility of the economic growth increases the 
credit spread will increase as well. This is because in a volatile economic environment, the 
firm will face more shortfalls in the cash flow. Finally, if the investors are more risk averse, 
the credit spread will widen. This is because during an economic downturn, investors tend to 
be more risk averse which will cause what we call “flight to quality” effect. (p.744) 
Tang and Yan (2010) also stated that analysis at the firm level explains the dynamics 
in the credit spread and explains the impact of the interaction between characteristics of a 
firm and the macroeconomic conditions. First, they explained that the credit spread increases 
with volatility of the cash flows and decrease with the firm’s current growth rate. Second, 
they stated that the correlation between the total output and the firm cash flow presents the 
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effect of the “cash flow beta”. During an economic downturn the credit spread will increase 
with the “cash flow beta” and vice versa. This shows the influence of the interaction between 
credit and market risk on the credit spread resulting from the “firm heterogeneity”. (p.744) 
Aaron, Armstrong and Zelmer (2007), stated that although the market risk is not one 
of the largest risks Canadian banks face, in the last few decades the importance to measure 
market risk became obvious. However, due to the complexity of the markets, there are a few 
challenges. The complex nature of the strategies and new products derived from the market 
operations has forced banks to rely on more quantitative models to measure market risk and 
manage the bank exposure.  Most banks use value at risk mode (VaR) to mange and measure 
their market risk exposure. VaR basically is the expected maximum loss a bank can 
experience, given at  a certain confidence level, over a specific time period. However, VaR 
has a major drawback, it is considered a looking backward tool, this is because it is based on 
historical events and it may not function accurately under sudden changes when volatilities’ 
correlation changes.  
There are a few challenges to find a model that can measure the integration of credit 
and market risk. The first challenge is that the metrics used to manage and measure each risk 
is not comparable. The credit risk model focuses on the losses from neglecting gains and 
defaults, while market models focus on capturing the full distributions of returns using VaR. 
Often, VaR includes losses and profits that come from any change in pricing factors, but it 
does not include dividends on trading books, accrued interest, and fee revenues.  As the time 
period is prolonged, it is important for economic capital, estimated from market risk, to 
consider funding interest costs and expected returns on portfolio positions. On the other hand, 
credit risk models usually do not model the full loss and profit distribution on “held to 
maturity positions”. These models usually ignore the “interest costs to fund the portfolio” and 
the “interest earnings on performing credits”. The second obstacle is the time horizon over 
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which each risk is being measured. These obstacles lead to the search for a highly 
technological infrastructure and data availability. In a nutshell, to have an accurate approach 
to measure credit and market integration the model must measure risk components on a 
consistent basis, the model must consider a common time period, and recognize all income 
sources. In the real world few models are capable of fulfilling such requirements. (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009) 
After discussing previous literature opinions about market and credit risk interaction 
and the difficulties in estimating this interaction quantitatively, the next section discusses the 
summary of previous work trials on how to quantify this interaction using different 
techniques. 
C. Summary of some Published Research on the Interaction between 
Market and Credit Risk  
The work done by Breuer et al. (2008) focused on credit and market risk interaction 
that resulted in variable rates of loan risks. When the interest rate increases, the amount that 
borrowers pay increases as well. As a result, additional defaults appear, as well as an increase 
in LGD and EAD. Their work was focusing on how to know the interaction of credit and 
market risk size. Their model was based on the assumption that EAD, LGD and PD depend 
on interest rates. They used a structural model assuming that the borrower defaults if his 
ability to pay is lower than the actual obligation. Although collaterals are very important to 
consider, their work did not include collaterals as one of the interaction channels. Their data 
was a quarterly frequency starting 1989 to 2005. They used the nominal GDP as the macro-
variable. GDP data for Austria was collected from International Monetary Fund. 
The authors concluded that the traditional perspective, which is due to diversification 
in the total economic capital, will be less than the sum of market’s capital and credit risks. 
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They proved that due to the negative interaction between credit and market risks, an 
additional economic capital will be required above the capital considering only credit risk on 
one hand, and only market risk on the other. Ignoring the interaction of risks will 
underestimate the amount of risk a bank faces. Loans with high LTV ratio will be more risky 
and therefore, underestimation of risk due to ignoring market and credit risks interaction will 
be more viable. The compounding effect strength resulting from the interaction between risks 
varies along with market size, confidence at which the calculation of risk capital takes place, 
and the correlation between credit and market risk factors. Therefore, it is not a rule that if 
each risk is calculated separately then added up, will always be lower than integrated risk 
(measured from the interaction of both market and credit risk together). (Breuer et al., 2008)  
Another work by Grundke (2005) was done to measure the integration of credit and 
market risk in portfolio modeling. He introduced interest rate risk in the model as the driving 
risk factor to the assets return and during the re-valuation of the bonds at the risk horizon. He 
assumed that the credit spreads and risk free interest rates are correlated. Moreover, the 
author shifted from using the assumptions of the common Credit Metrics of normally 
disturbed assets returns, and rather used the multivariate t-distribution to be able to model the 
“joint behavior of the debtors’ asset returns”.  Morgan (1997) mentioned that credit Metrics is 
available for the portfolio model that evaluates credit risk. This approach allowed the 
company to combine the credit risk across the entire corporation. As a result, it gives them a 
“statement of Value at Risk” because of credit risk caused by defaults, downgrades or 
upgrades. He also replaced the independent random variable recovery rate, by a recovery rate 
which depends on the realization of the unsystematic and systematic risk factors driving the 
asset returns. Therefore, he took into account that recovery rates and credit risk are not 
independent. So according to his work, recovery risk, interest rate and credit spread are all 
correlated. (Grundke, 2005) 
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Grundke (2005) concluded through his simulations that for low degrees of asset return 
correlation between borrowers with high quality credit portfolios, ignoring risk integration is 
very significant. These results support the conclusion that for high quality debt, spread risk is 
very crucial. As Grundke considered the inhomogeneous portfolio composition, the 
systematic recovery rate risk and non normal asset return distributions decrease the effect of 
the underestimation of economic capital.  
Fiori and Lannotti (2010) worked on a data set from the bank of Italy and used the 
Factor Augmented Vector Auto-Regression (FAVAR) approach. According to Ahmadi and 
Ritschl (2009), the FAVAR is based on two steps. The first step is checking the “common 
dynamics in a large panel of time series” using Factor model. The second step is testing for 
the causality effect using Vector Auto-Regression (VAR), accounting for the factors relevant 
to the analysis derived from the Factor model. The estimation equation is generated using 
simultaneous equations, or estimation in two steps, one for the principle component for 
Factor model, and the other for the Maximum Likelihood function. They analyzed the credit 
and market risk interaction by using Italian data set starting from 1999 till 2006.  They 
applied the factor model to recognize the common risk sources that derive the variations in 
both financial and real sectors. Then, they analyzed this factor model in a VAR framework, 
resulting in a FAVAR model. Their basic assumption is that there are few common factors 
that cause “macro-financial” variations. They tried to shed some light on risk interaction 
through studying the responses of some particular variables to a “monetary policy shock”. 
(Fiori & Lannotti, 2010, p.5) 
Fiori and Lannotti, (2010) used the FAVAR approach to a 99 quarterly time series of 
a balanced panel from March 1991 to September 2006. Their data included the following: 
A. Macroeconomic variables included: 
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• Industrial production indexes. 
• Real GDP growth. 
• Unit labor cost 
• Household consumption. 
• Spread between lending rate to firms and the risk free rate. 
• Inflation rate changes. 
• Exchange rate changes home currency and the US dollar. 
• The difference between the average and the minimum rate on loans to firms. 
• Spread between lending rate to firms and the risk free rate. 
B. Indicators for Credit risk: presented through 8 industrial sectors default rates. The 
concept of defaulting is based on the definition of a bad loan. They define bad loans 
as “the ratio of the number of new borrowers defaulting to the number of performing 
borrowers at the beginning of the period.” 
C. Market Risk Factors 
• They used returns on the Italian stock market index to capture the equity market 
uncertainty. 
• Price-Earnings ratio for Italian stock market index. 
• To account for the yield curve characteristics they calculated the difference between 3 
months Treasury bill rate, ten year government bond and changes in real long term 
interest rate. 
D. Indicators for Global Conditions 
• Oil prices. 
• S&P 500 
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Fiori and Lannotti (2010) stated that FAVAR approach consists of two steps. The first 
step is the few unobservable factors that are obtained from a big cross sectional panel data. 
The second step is the common factors that are plugged in the factor model then inserted in a 
VAR analysis to obtain “the impulse response functions (IRF) of the original variables in the 
data set specific to shock”. (p.8) 
They concluded that the credit and market risk interaction showed that the monetary 
policy shock impact on the total default rate is approximately halved (If the effect of equity 
market shock is ignored). The total default Impulse Response Function (IRF) is not affected 
by the volatility risk factor. The authors concluded that 55% of the total variation is explained 
by credit risk driver, volatility risk driver, macroeconomic risk driver and equity risk driver. 
These four factors with short term interest rates are assumed to be the observed variables and 
are the common sources of risk in the financial sector and in the economy. Ignoring the 
interaction between market and credit risk can lead to biased overall risk exposure (whether 
overestimation or underestimation). (Fiori & Lannotti, 2010) 
Htay and Salman (2013) conducted a research on ten listed banks in the United 
Kingdom ranging from the years 2002-2011. Their research methodology was to study the 
correlation between four different types of risks (credit, market, liquidity and operational) 
faced by banks1. They concluded that every bank has different risks relationship compared to 
other banks. This might be due to the fact that each bank has a certain approach in measuring 
the risk they face. Also, each bank alleviates risks through different tools that possess 
different benchmarks. Consequently, correlation results will differ from one bank to the 
other.  
 
1 For details on the representation of these variables refer to Wong & Hui (2009) page 53. 
41 
Wong and Hui (2009) conducted a study to measure the interaction between market 
and credit risk in banking sector through a “liquidity risk stress testing”. This was obtained by 
using available public data of 12 listed banks in Hong Kong. They focused on showing the 
link between market risk, liquidity risk and credit risk. Their framework can act as a tool to 
complement the work with the “bottom-up” approach for the “liquidity risk stress testing”.  
Their stress testing framework consists of two parts. Part one is a system of equations 
that identify the different risks interaction and estimate cash flows, balance sheet items, 
liquidity risk of each bank, and default risk in the face of the shocks of market risk. The 
second part is the creation of market risks for different assets by using the Monte Carlo 
simulation (Wong and Hui, 2009). Monte Carlo simulation is a technique of a simulation that 
depends on statistical analysis and repetitive random sampling to calculate the results. Monte 
Carlo simulation is similar to the random experiments where we do not know the results in 
advance. Therefore, it is also similar to the “what if analysis”. (Raychaudhuri, 2008) 
Based on the system of equations2 and the Monte Carlo simulations of market risk 
shocks, the indicators of liquidity risk can be estimated for each bank. While applying Monte 
Carlo’s approach, the authors assume that asset-market disruptions are the main sources of 
the stress. One year of “negative exogenous asset-price shocks” are assumed in each stress 
scenario, including structured financial assets, equities, and debt securities. (Wong & Hui, 
2009, p.6) 
The authors’ results are in accordance with the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision’s principles. A bank needs a proper liquid cushion to have a sound liquidity risk 
management. A bank must focus on the risks that can arise from the decline in the prices of 
asset, increasing the risk of defaulting. Also, they must have a sufficient liquefiable assets 
 
2 For details on the system of equations used and simulation refer to Wong & Hui (2009) page 7. 
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base to withstand any financial stress. Their framework can identify how proper the liquidity 
cushions of a bank through quantifying the “expected default time” and “the expected cash 
shortage time”. (Wong and Hui, 2009, p. 20) 
Drehmann, Sorensen, and Stringa (2010) tried to model both sides of the bank’s 
balance sheet (liabilities, off balance sheet items, & assets) and they accounted for “their re-
pricing characteristics”. The re-pricing of assets and liabilities usually takes place when there 
are major changes in the interest rates in the market. A bank faces an interest rate risk when 
the gap between the interest bearing liabilities that have shorter maturity and the earning 
assets increases, and so, a re-pricing characteristic appears. (Banner Corporation, 2009) 
In order to analyze the bank’s risk likelihood, they applied stress testing.  They had 
two criteria on which they based their work. First criterion is “the capital adequacy 
condition” (as it reflects the current general approach). Second criterion is the “economic 
value condition” (to show whether the bank’s assets are larger than the value of its liabilities) 
(Drehmann, Sorensen, and Stringa, 2010, p.713). Since the bank’s assets and liabilities are 
related to the interest rates, the authors discuss the Economic Value Added (EVA). EVA is a 
measure based on the financial performance. It is a performance measure and an investment 
decision tool that reflects the value created to the shareholders. It is calculated as the “net 
operating profit minus an appropriate charge for the opportunity cost of all capital invested in 
an enterprise or project”. (Geyser & IE Liebenberg, 2003) 
The authors afterwards conducted the stress testing3. Their results showed that for 
credit spread yield curves and risk free rates, the GDP remains increasing, despite the fact 
that growth decreases significantly (bearing in mind that in the end of 2005 there were strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals, while the impact of the shocks on the economy is less harsh 
 
3 For futher details on stress testing refer to Drehmann, Sorensen, & Stringa (2010) page 717 to 720. 
43 
than the recession in the early 1990s). Subsequent to the “stress, the risk free yield curves 
shifts upward with the short end of the curve around 5.5% in the first quarter increasing 
steadily over the three years, reaching almost 10% three years after the shock” . The largest 
increase in spreads was on loans for mortgages. Despite the fact that the credit spread did not 
increase much, it was relatively high for mortgages. The macroeconomic shock did affect the 
corporate spread much. The reason is that relatively “high credit quality of the bank’s 
corporate lending book” was consistent with the passive increase in the corporate spread. (p. 
720) 
For the Economic Value (EV) condition, the net EV was measured to be 7.3% of “the 
face value of these assets”. This amount is equal to the book value of assets without off 
balance sheet items or liabilities. After the shock, immediately this value drops to 5.7%.  This 
drop is around 21% of a fall that consists of interest rate and credit risk combined together 
(long term impact). From the author’s point of view, this fall is not big enough to threaten the 
hypothetical bank stability. Therefore, condition one of EV is not violated. (Drehmann, 
Sorensen, & Stringa, 2010, p.720) 
For the second condition, the capital adequacy, the impact of both net interest income 
and write offs drop the net profits by more than 50% in the 8th quarter, then it starts to 
recover4. The shock’s impact halved the return on equity (ROE) two years after the shock 
(that was initially 20% in the baseline scenario). In general, the stress scenario seems to 
weaken the stability of the hypothetical bank, but it does not threaten its stability. (Drehmann, 
Sorensen, & Stringa, 2010) 
For the integration of credit and market risk, the results show that the increase in 
interest rate is the main reason of the drop of net profit. That is because it increases the write 
 
4 For further details on the results refer to figure 2 in Drehmann, Sorensen, & Stringa (2010) page721. 
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offs and tightens the net margins. The following results show how important it is for a bank 
to assess the credit and market risk jointly.  If the bank only focuses on the credit risk impact 
on the write offs without considering the interest rate risk, it will lead to an overestimation of 
the overall negative impact on the net profit by approximately 25%5.  However, the impact is 
not the same over time. For instance, if the bank focuses on the write offs only during the first 
year, while ignoring the decrease in the “net interest income”, the negative impact 
(underestimation) on the net profit will be over 50%. By the third year however, the bank re-
prices a big proportion of its assets, which leads to an increase in the “net interest income”. 
On the other hand, if the bank just focuses on the impact of the high interest rate through a 
sole focus on the “sensitivity analysis based on its re-pricing mismatch”, this will lead to an 
underestimation of the shock negative impact by approximately 30% along the three years 
period.  (Drehmann, Sorensen, & Stringa, 2010, p. 721& 722) 
For the capital adequacy, the interaction of interest rate and credit risk leads to a fall 
in the profits. Consequently, this will be reflected in the capital adequacy (using constant risk 
weights). As the credit quality decreases and the risk weights do not adjust the bank’s capital, 
adequacy will decrease. But, for the risk weights that change as the credit quality changes, the 
risk weights will adjust. The increase in these weights will cause the capital adequacy of the 
bank to fall. So we can conclude that credit risk is the main drive under “time varying risk 
weights”6. (Drehmann, Sorensen, & Stringa, 2010, p. 723) 
Drehmann, Sorensen, and Stringa’s (2010) work considered the reliance of credit risk 
on the sudden changes in the interest rates. They proved that the sensitivity gap analysis 
shows the impact of the interest rate alone, yet, it does not take into account the impact of 
credit risk. It also ignored the importance of the interaction between credit and market risk. 
 
5For further details on the ROE results refer to figure 2 in Drehmann, Sorensen, & Stringa (2010) page721. 
6 For details on the graphs regarding the integration results refer to Drehmann, Sorensen, & Stringa (2010) page721-722. 
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They concluded that any deterioration in the fundamentals of the bank can increase its 
funding costs and consequently lower their profits. The standard macro-stress testing cannot 
capture such risk, as only a model that considers both risks jointly can do the job. 
The work of Alessandri and Drehmann (2010) was based on the accounting books of 
the bank. Ignoring the interaction between credit and interest rate risk will lead to errors when 
measuring risks. This error depends on the re-pricing characteristics of liabilities and assets as 
well as the structure of the balance sheet. Their model is similar to the model of Drehmann, 
Sorensen, and Stringa (2010) with a similar stress scenario that uses “decision support 
system” (DSS) to analyze this scenario. The DSS is an IT system that helps an organization 
in their decision making process. It assists the users to go through a huge “reams of data” and 
analyze it. It also collects the suitable information for use to develop a better decision making 
through solving the problems an organization faces. (Decision Support System - DSS, 2015) 
Alessandri and Drehmann (2010) stated two assumptions for the multiple period 
frame-works. The first assumption is that “depositors are passive: once deposits mature, 
depositors are willing to roll them over thus maintaining the same re-pricing characteristics”. 
The second assumption is that “the bank does not actively manage its portfolio composition: 
if assets mature or default, the bank continues to invest into new projects with the same re-
pricing and risk characteristics as the matured assets. In addition, the bank replaces “the 
defaulted assets with new assets”, that have identical re-pricing characteristics and risk level, 
at the end of each period7. (p.733) 
Alessandri and Drehmann (2010) implemented their model through a vector of 
random macroeconomic shocks. They used a Global VAR to find out the macroeconomic 
state (plus the risk free yield curve). Afterwards, through using simple regression equations, 
 
7 For further details on the assumption refer to Alessandri & Drehmann (2010) page 733. 
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they got the PD based on the new macroeconomic conditions. Next, they calculate the NI (net 
interest income) when the bank re-price their liabilities and assets using the "first re-pricing 
bucket" (they did not use maturity buckets to capture the effect of the macroeconomic 
variables on the net interest income of the bank). Then through simulation, the RNI (realized 
net interest income), L (loss of the portfolio) and NP (net profits) are calculated. The data 
used was from a UK bank balance sheet. They estimated the re-pricing buckets by averaging 
the balance sheets of the top 10 UK banks. To limit their systematic risk model, they assumed 
that the bank is exposed only to US and UK assets and that the bank is completely funded 
through UK deposits. Their risk classes in focus were: 
• Mortgage lending to households 
• Inter-banking 
• Government lending 
• Unsecured lending to households 
• Lending to other financial corporation’s (OFCs) 
• Lending to private non-financial corporation’s (PNFCs) 
The final results were that the average growth was approximately 2%; meanwhile, 
over the four quarters the interest rates changed by 100 basis points (or more). The default 
probabilities were not very volatile and were low. The difference between the integrated EC 
and the simple EC was huge. This is resulting from the fact that the unexpected negative 
profits are covered by the integrated EC8. They also concluded that one of the reasons for the 
difference between the integrated and simple EC is that the correlation between interest rates 
and systematic credit risk factors is not perfect. (Alessandri & Drehmann, 2010) 
 
8 For details on the sensitivity analysis refer to Alessandri & Drehmann ( 2010) page 738. 
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Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), focused on measuring the interaction between credit 
and liquidity risk. Their work is of importance to my paper, where I am measuring whether 
the market and credit risk affect each other or not, because they clearly set a definition on 
how to measure credit risk. Their data set was from 1998 first quarter to 2010 third quarter, 
including 4046 non-default US commercial banks. They also included 254 default banks 
from 2006 first quarter to 2010 third quarter.  The data for profit and loss, off-balance sheet 
items, and balance sheet was retrieved from Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) call report on quarterly basis. This data is publicly available and can be 
retrieved through the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The banks in their dataset were “US 
based and held banks”. Moreover, all the analysis was done on the charter bank and not the 
holding company level. The information needed on the banks was retrieved from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) public database.  For the macroeconomic variables, 
they used the public database of St. Louis Federal Reserve (FRED). The variables used by 
authors are: proxy for liquidity risk and proxy for credit risk. The controlled variables are: 
• Total assets 
• Capital ratio 
• Return on assets 
• Standard deviation return on assets 
• Efficiency ratio (Expenses, without including interest expense,/ Revenues) (Hays, 
Lurigo, Gilbert, 2009) 
• Loan growth 
• Ratio trading assets/total assets 
• Ratio private/total loans 
• Ratio commercial/total loans 
• Ratio real estate/total loans 
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• Ratio short term/long term deposits 
• Net off-balance sheet derivative exposure 
• Other net off-balance sheet exposure 
They calculated the proxy for credit risk as “measuring the unexpected loan default 
ratio of a bank, as represented by the net loan losses in the current period to the allowances 
for these loan losses recorded in the previous period”.  This proxy shows how accurate is the 
bank management to forecast short term loan losses. Also, it captured the current level of 
riskiness of the loan portfolio.  The author’s analysis included the measurement of the 
relationship between credit and liquidity risk in banks. They checked if the relationship was a 
reciprocal one between the two risks. The results showed no reliable connection. They used a 
panel-VAR (Vector Auto-Regression) econometric model that uses two simultaneous 
equations and they controlled for the lagged and contemporary influence between the two 
risks. (Imbierowicz & Rauch, 2014) 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) analysis showed no reliable relationship between the 
two risks, they did a multivariate logistic regression model to check whether credit and 
liquidity risk contribute to the bank’s probability of default. They found out that each risk 
impact the bank’s PD separately and their joint interaction has an additional impact on the 
bank’s PD. They concluded that the interaction between the two risks is very crucial on the 
bank stability and it highly affects the probability of default.  
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Chapter III: Data and Methodology 
A.Description of Data and Sample Collection 
Upon starting my research, I intended to test my empircal model on the listed 
Egyptian banks. However, this was a challenege due to the unavailability of data and the 
empirical model proved unsuccesful. The sources checked were: 
• CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) website 
• EFSA (Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority) website 
• Reuters DataStream database 
• Reuters Eikon  database 
• Reuters Knowledge database 
• Bank Scope database 
• CBE (Central Bank of Egypt) website 
• Ministry of Finance website 
• World Bank website 
• IMF website 
From these databases, I could not find historical data within the years 2004 to 2014 to 
conduct the analysis. One of the reasons for the unavailability of data is that the CBE regime 
did not require from Egyptian banks to report detailed analysis on their loans in their 
financial statements until after December 2008. The banks started to report the detailed 
information starting 2010. Therefore, I did not have access to the historical series. The only 
available data is for the last 5 years and yet, for some variables there are missing years.  
This is why; I decided to apply the developed model to the emerging economies. 
According to Bloomberg Best (and Worst) (2015), the list of the best 22 emerging countries 
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in 2014 are, China, South Koran, Malaysia, Chile, Thailand, Panama, Peru, Latvia, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Colombia, Turkey, Hungary, Russia, Brazil, Philippines, Mexico, Indonesia, 
South Africa, Morocco, India and Egypt. After checking the data availability on Reuters 
DataStream across the emerging economies listed above. I decided to restrict my analysis to 
the following countries, as they report the needed data, Brazil, China, Malaysia, Colombia, 
Indonesia, Egypt, Poland, Turkey and South Africa.  
At the country level I collected beta and GDP growth rate from Reuters DataStream. 
All of the data collected are public available data. The real GDP growth rate was retrieved 
from IMF for all countries. Consumer Price Index (CPI) was retrieved from Reuters Eikon 
for all countries. Eikon definition for CPI Y/Y is “the measure that examines the weighted 
average of prices of a basket of consumer goods and services, such as transportation, food 
and medical care. The CPI is calculated by taking price changes for each item in the 
predetermined basket of goods and averaging them; the selected goods are weighted 
according to their importance. Changes in CPI are used to assess price changes associated 
with the cost of living, and this is done on year over year measurement basis”.  
For each country I collected the available data for the selected banks from 2004 to 
2013 on quarterly basis from Reuters DataStream. We have a total of 26 banks across the 9 
countries that have complete data set from 2004 to 2013 on quarterly basis (retrieved from 
DataStream). For each bank I collected the following variables: 
i. Provision for loan losses. 
ii. Actual loan losses. 
iii. Actual recoveries. 
iv. Return on Assets (ROA). 
v. Efficiency Ratio. 
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vi. EPS. 
vii. Loan growth rate. 
viii. Beta. 
B.Methodoloy 
The methodology used is similar to that of Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014). I followed 
the same concept for measuring the credit proxy because it suits my objective of the analysis 
and it follows a methodology that suits the availability of the data that I have. I calculated the 
credit risk (CR) proxy in a similar manner like Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014). My CR proxy 
is calculated by using actual loan losses, from which we subtracted actual loan recoveries, 
and then I divided the whole term by the provision for loan losses of the previous period. If 
the CR proxy is above 1, it means that there are unexpected losses. The market risk (MR) is 
presented as beta of the bank. I could not use the spread between the lending and deposit rate 
of the bank due to the unavailability of the lending and deposit rates on the banks level. 
The model used is Bayesian Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model for estimation. 
The equations used in the model: 
DCR = C(1)*DCR(-1) + C(2)*DMR(-1) + C(3)  Equation (1) 
DMR = C(4)*DCR(-1) + C(5)*DMR(-1) + C(6)  Equation (2) 
DCR = C(1)*DCR(-1) + C(2)*DMR(-1) + C(3) + C(4)*DCPI + C(5)*DGDP + 
C(6)*DEFFICIENCY + C(7)*DROA  + C(8)*LOANGROWTH + C(9)*DEPS  Equation 
(3) 
DMR = C(10)*DCR(-1) + C(11)*DMR(-1) + C(12) + C(13)*DCPI + C(14)*DGDP + 
C(15)*DEFFICIENCY + C(16)*DROA + C(17)*LOANGROWTH + C(18)*DEPS
 Equation (4) 
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Where, DCR is the first difference of the credit risk, DMR is the first difference of the market 
risk, DCPI is the first difference of the consumer price index, DGDP is the first difference of 
the growth rate of the real gross domestic product, DEFFICIENCY is the first difference of 
the efficiency ratio, DROA is the first difference of the return on assets, DLoanGrowth is the 
first difference of the loan growth rate, and DEPS is the first difference of the earnings per 
share 
I conducted time series Bayesian VAR analysis per bank with one lag, with beta as 
proxy to market risk. The control variables used in the model are: 
• Return on Assets. 
• Real GDP growth. 
• CPI. 
• Efficiency Ratio. ((Expenses, without including interest expense,/Revenues, Hays, 
Lurigo, Gilbert, 2009) 
• EPS. 
• Loan Growth rate. 
I ran the model for each bank twice. First, I ran the model with beta as market risk 
proxy and without using any control variables. Second, with beta as proxy to market risk and 
I added the control variables. Moreover, I tested each model using different prior types and 
initial residual covariance options (variance-covariance matrix).   
Table 4: The Prior Types tested 
Prior Type 
Litterman/
Minnesota 
1 
Litterman/
Minnesota 
2 
Litterman/
Minnesota 
3 
Normal
-
Wishart 
Sims-Zha 
(normal-
wishart) 
Sims-Zha 
(normal-
wishart)2 
Sims-Zha 
(Normal 
Flat) 
Sims-Zha 
(Normal 
Flat)2 
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The prior type for the VAR can be easily explained through the idea of a dummy 
variable in the ordinary regression equations. Basically, it is like adding extra data to our 
sample that state “prior” beliefs about the parameters in use. The prior type takes the 
likelihood function form. Difference between it and dummy used in a regression equation is 
that the extra data added are used in all of the system of equations in VAR (many equations). 
Sometimes the researcher can have certain beliefs about parameters in one equation, but not 
the others. Other times, the researcher has a belief for each equation. The 
Litterman/Minnesota prior type that is widely used in VAR estimations consider this type of 
belief mentioned above. This prior creates dummy for each equation. (Sims 2006) 
Therefore, Litterman/Minnesota is based on the concept that each series is described 
best when they are considered as a random walk around a deterministic component that is 
unknown. Therefore, the distribution of the prior type is centered on the variable random 
walk specification (Kenny, Meyler, & Quinn, 1998).  According to Sims (2006), the other 
prior type is Sims and Zha and it was introduced in 1997. This approach was suggested 
because of the inconsistency in Litterman/Minnesota prior type. The dummy created by 
Litterman/Minnesota prior type differs from one equation to the other because it treats its 
“own lags as different from other coefficients”. Sims and Zha prior type solve this problem 
and create consistency. (Sims & Zha, 1997) 
Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2003), explain the Normal-Wishart prior type in terms of 
what they call the conjugate prior distributions, they are a mathematical way that allows us 
conveniently to correct for Litterman/Minnesota prior type drawbacks. The term conjugate is 
a property by which the distribution follows the parametric form distribution as the 
distribution of the prior type. The Normal-Wishart prior type drops the assumption of the 
diagonal and fixed variance-covariance matrix of the residuals.  
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The Normal-Wishart prior type fixes one of the shortcomings of the 
Litterman/Minnesota prior type. The Litterman/Minnesota prior type fixes the “residual 
variance-covariance matrix” for all equations.  In contrast, the Normal-Wishart prior type 
uses a certain structure for the variance-covariance matrix that treats all of the equations 
symmetrically (with the use of scale factor for all equations).  Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) 
I could not run the model twice, once with financial crisis and another without the 
financial crisis, due to the fact that my sample size is only 40 observations and I cannot afford 
losing any of them. In addition, the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) could not be 
used due to the fact that not all of my variables across the 26 banks are non-stationary at the 
first difference, which violates one of the necessary conditions allowing the use of the 
VECM.  
I investigated the relationship between market and credit risk using unrestricted VAR 
(classical estimation method). However, the results did not show any significance. 
Afterwards, I tried the Bayesian VAR as my estimation technique, and it gave more accurate 
results. According to Rebucci and Ciccarelli (2003), using Bayesian approach to estimate 
VARs is a strong approach because the Bayesian approach considers the sturcture of the true 
population as uncertain. Hence, it does not put much weight on any specific value of the 
parameters of the model. As an alternative, this approach takes this uncertainty into 
consideration in the form of a “prior probability distribution” over the parameters of the 
model. This prior disturbtion can change the  degree of uncertainty according to the 
information reflected in the data. Therefore, Bayesian VAR is a better approach in estimation 
than the classcial unrestircted VAR.  
Any empirical model combine both priori information and historical ones. Some 
modeling estimation methods can use different weights to prior and sample information. The 
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classical unrestircted VAR use a very sparse prior information when choosing the lag length, 
identification restrictions, and variables. As a result, when the data sample is short, 
overfitting may occur. This leads to weak sample information, which leads to a weak 
forecasting estimation. Bayesian VARs overcome these problems and make the sample fit 
better. This yields better estimation results. (Canova, 2007) 
Bilger and Manning  (2015), define overfitting as the phenomenon when we try to fit 
a model, we try to choose the part of the “idiosyncratic characteristics” of the data available 
beside the systematic relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables.  
Overfitting takes place when the model is very complex in relation to the amount of available 
data. This phenomenon is a threat because when the model is over explained, it causes doubts 
on both, the magnitude of the estimates and the statistical significance. As a result, the 
perfomrance of the model becomes very weak.  
C.Results 
The table below shows the estimation results for running the model by using beta as 
market risk proxy and without using any control variables.  
56 
Table 5: Estimations with Beta as Market risk proxy (t-statistic reported) 
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As shown from table 5 above almost the entire sample shows insignificant results at 
level of alpha of 5%, 10% and 15%.  At a crude level these results show that market and 
credit risk does not affect each other. However, further discussion in the next section will 
show that this might not be the true results due to the biasness in the sample.  
Table 6: Number of Banks significant using different Prior Types: 
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Table 6 above shows how many banks showed that market and credit risk affects each 
other at different levels of alpha using different prior types.   
Table 7 below shows the estimation results for running the model by using beta as 
market risk proxy with the use of the control variables.  
Table 7: Estimations with Beta as Market risk proxy (t-statistic reported) 
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Table 7 shows improved results compared to table 5 because of the use of the control 
variables. However, still small numbers of banks are significant (with t statistic less than α of 
5%) 
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Table 8: Number of Banks significant using different Prior Types: 
 
The numbers of banks that show that market and credit risk affect each other 
improved. However, the overall results still present us a small number of banks.  
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Chapter IV: Discussion and Conclusion 
Market and credit risk are two mechanisms that are used to evaluate a banks 
operations and whether they will survive. This research intents to assess whether there is a 
relationship between said mechanism and  banks operations within certain banks in the 
emerging economies from 2004 Q1 to 2013 Q4.  The study shows that credit and market risk 
do not affect each other in most of the banks in the sample. However, this does not mean that 
ERM is not should not be implemented. There are a lot of reasons and limitations that will be 
discussed that affected the results. Like the work of Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), when 
they used microeconomic and macroeconomic variables (like the one used in this paper) 
using structural VAR technique, they could not find a relationship between the market and 
credit risk in the sample of banks they used (banks in USA). The body of existing literature 
that discuss the relationship between market and credit risk is very large. However, 
unexpectedly few papers analyze the interaction between the two risks. 
Despite the limitations faced, the results still show that in few number of banks 
market and credit risk affect each other. However, there are a lot of reasons and limitations 
that impact the data that have to be taken in consideration. First, I will discuss the limitations 
of my research. The fact that my sample comes from emerging economies affects the data 
vastly. To start with, there is limited historical data that can be used to run the analysis on. 
Moreover, only very few number of banks report the data needed for the calculation of the 
credit risk proxy. Notably, my market risk proxy is not very strong due to the lack of the data 
needed permitting the calculation of stronger proxy (the lending and deposit rates on the 
banks level are not available). The alternative proxy used was the beta of each bank. Here, a 
major problem arises, which is the “Efficient Market Hypothesis”. As a result, it affects my 
results directly.  
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The “Efficient Market Hypothesis” is linked to the idea of the “random walk”. The 
term “random walk” is commonly used in the literature to describe a series price, where the 
changes in prices are random and independent from the changes in the previous prices. The 
rationale behind the “random walk” is that prices reflect the information in the market every 
day and this information is available to everyone in the market. Meaning that the changes in  
today’s price, is reflected on today’s news only, and it is independent of the news of 
yesterday. Since the news is unpredictable and random, changes in the price should follow 
the same trend. Therefore, we can conclude that the prices reflect  all available information in 
the market (Malkiel, 2003). However, this is not the case in the emerging markets; 
information is not available to everyone. Moreover, the prices of today are affected by the 
prices of yesterday and there is a high correlation between them. So the “Efficient Market 
Hypothesis” does not hold in these markets. 
According to Summers (1986), the “Efficient Market Hypothesis” assume that in 
some sense the prices of the assets are related to economic realities in a rational way. On the 
contrary, a lot of researchers discussed that the asset prices are not possibly related to 
economic realities in such a rational way. Few authors showed that, in fact, because of 
inflation, the stock market in undervalued. Also, they show that stock prices are very volatile 
compared to the real economy due to speculative behavior and the psychology of the stock 
market investors. According to the usual economic theory, the market forces will eliminate 
the irrational traders. However, this is not the case in the real markets. This is due to the fact 
that the more risk the traders take, the higher the reward. Therefore, we can find some traders 
that force certain stocks to be traded more than others and even can dominate the market so 
they can make more money. Plus, researchers found that some traders follow certain 
strategies that are not related to fundamental valuation techniques. As a result, there is no 
evidence that show that irrational traders will be eventually eliminated out of the market. 
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So using the beta as market risk proxy for emerging economies might not be very 
strong proxy that captures the market risk due to the discussion above about the “Efficient 
Market Hypothesis”. Therefore, there is an embedded bias in the results obtained. Along with 
the fact that the historical data is not available and the time series available is very short, it 
affects the estimation of the model as well. Another limitation is the fact that I cannot 
incorporate more than one lag in my VAR because I have only 40 observations. Since this 
paper aim is to test whether market and credit risk impact each other, I need more time to 
check the trend and capture more business cycles.  
One more limitation in the emerging economies, is the fact that the firm specific 
variables and the macroeconomic variables have limited impact on credit and market risk 
since the markets are inefficient and the firm specific variables are not moving along with the 
macroeconomic variables. For example, in Egypt, we can witness a positive trend in the 
EGX30, while the real GDP growth rate is having a negative trend.   
According to Urosevic, Karapandza, Bozovic, and Advantage (2009), the legal 
environment in the emerging economies is often self contradictory and obsolete. They 
mention that the banks that are free to develop their own risk models face a lot of problems, 
mainly caused by the lack of interest in the academic community and the lack of human 
capital that can help develop proper models. Moreover, the legal constraints in the emerging 
economies hinder the development of a proper risk model along with the above mentioned 
points, creating an obstacle for the banks management to handle risk properly. As for banks 
that follow their central banks guidance on their risk model, they also could face the problem 
that the models proposed might not be proper for the nature of their business model.  
The problems faced by banks in emerging economies are remarkably different than 
those faced by the banks in the developed economies. In any economy, the balance sheet of a 
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bank is the central element of the transmission and allocation of the risk. In the emerging 
economies, banks often accommodate the demand on loans by taking foreign credit lines. 
They may even offer deposits in foreign currency to attract the foreign investors. Also, to 
match their foreign currency liabilities they may expand their domestic loans in foreign 
currency.  Due to the fact that the emerging economies governments usually have high 
deficits in the public sectors, the banks in those economies can face large exposure to the 
government papers. Additionally, the practices and supervisory frameworks are not applied in 
emerging economies. This creates a problem of efficiency in the banking system. The main 
difference between the emerging and developed economies banks is the size of the trading 
books compared to banking books. Trading books that are small in size involve assets that are 
illiquid. Thus, this has important effects on the bank’s ability to hedge its risk exposures, 
particularly the market risk in the bank’s banking book. (Urosevic, Karapandza, Bozovic, and 
Advantage, 2009) 
Another crucial point to be considered in the emerging economies banks, is that when 
they try to balance their local foreign currency liabilities, they tend to increase their foreign 
currency lending to locals. Therefore, the majority of the foreign currency deposits are 
compensated by the domestic loans with foreign currency, and not by the assets the bank hold 
abroad. This shows that in case of an exchange rate adjustment in the economy, the bank’s 
balance sheet will depend significantly on the performance of their domestic loans held in 
foreign currency. (Urosevic, Karapandza, Bozovic, and Advantage, 2009) 
To conclude, the implementation of ERM in the emerging economies banking system 
is crucial, for one of the reasons that some of the existing banks in the emerging economies 
are subsidiaries of other banks in developed economies (that apply ERM). As a result, those 
banks in the emerging economies that do not apply ERM their business process is inefficient 
and their risk managemnt is weak. Adding to that, If the banking system in the emerging 
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markets did not change their risk measures and started implementing the necessary steps to 
have a full ERM program, they will face troubles whenever the market conditions are down 
or deteriorating.  
The results shown in this paper suggest that there is a few number of banks that 
proved that the two risks in question affect each other, despite of the numerous limitations 
faced to come at a proof of such a relation. Therefore, I suggest that a joint management of 
credit and market risk in banks could significantly improve the stability of the banking sector 
in the emerging economies. Therefore, this paper supports the framework of Basel III and the 
fact that they stress on the importance of the joint management between credit and market 
risk in banks. For future work, the same study can be repeated with longer time period and 
with another proxy for market risk (spread between lending and deposit rates on the bank 
leve). Also researchers can try to run the study with another credit risk proxy that presents the 
credit risk as the probability of default instead of the credit risk proxy used in the paper and 
check whether the findings will differ or not.   
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Appendicies 
The following table shows the banks and the variables with their codes that are included in 
the sample retrieved from Reuters DataStream and Reuters Eikon 
Bank Name 
ITAU UNIBANCO 
HOLDING PN  Brazil 
       
BANK ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
BR:IU4 2004-1 2.72 0.83 4.22 6.76 3.30 0.14 NA 0.72 
BR:IU4 2004-2 4.79 0.90 6.20 5.49 3.30 0.00 0.35 0.72 
BR:IU4 2004-3 5.11 0.88 6.28 6.90 3.30 -0.05 0.33 0.72 
BR:IU4 2004-4 4.73 0.85 6.07 7.23 3.30 0.07 0.35 0.72 
BR:IU4 2005-1 6.99 0.71 4.16 7.45 3.85 0.34 0.53 0.74 
BR:IU4 2005-2 2.23 0.76 4.33 7.80 3.85 0.01 0.55 0.74 
BR:IU4 2005-3 2.00 0.74 2.10 6.21 3.85 0.13 0.60 0.74 
BR:IU4 2005-4 1.87 0.85 2.14 6.09 3.85 0.05 0.63 0.74 
BR:IU4 2006-1 2.44 0.78 4.33 5.51 2.77 0.28 0.47 0.87 
BR:IU4 2006-2 1.20 0.62 1.93 4.30 2.77 0.09 0.51 0.87 
BR:IU4 2006-3 1.26 0.72 4.75 3.84 2.77 0.00 0.50 0.87 
BR:IU4 2006-4 1.20 0.70 4.85 3.14 2.77 0.00 0.50 0.87 
BR:IU4 2007-1 2.21 0.73 5.16 2.99 3.45 0.39 0.99 0.77 
BR:IU4 2007-2 2.16 0.69 6.43 3.29 3.45 0.05 1.05 0.77 
BR:IU4 2007-3 2.02 0.84 6.06 4.02 3.45 0.07 1.12 0.77 
BR:IU4 2007-4 2.00 0.72 6.67 4.26 3.45 0.05 1.17 0.77 
BR:IU4 2008-1 1.89 0.98 6.29 4.63 3.13 1.13 0.81 1.03 
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BR:IU4 2008-2 0.77 0.98 6.46 5.56 3.13 0.02 0.84 1.03 
BR:IU4 2008-3 0.75 0.97 7.12 6.26 3.13 0.08 0.89 1.03 
BR:IU4 2008-4 0.84 0.58 0.96 6.23 3.13 -0.20 0.66 1.03 
BR:IU4 2009-1 2.16 0.57 -2.71 5.78 1.72 -0.15 0.83 0.81 
BR:IU4 2009-2 1.88 0.59 -2.40 5.18 1.72 0.05 0.83 0.81 
BR:IU4 2009-3 1.55 0.55 -1.47 4.40 1.72 0.13 0.93 0.81 
BR:IU4 2009-4 1.44 0.62 5.31 4.23 1.72 0.09 1.05 0.81 
BR:IU4 2010-1 1.71 0.63 9.34 4.86 2.13 0.21 1.40 0.80 
BR:IU4 2010-2 2.41 0.64 8.76 5.11 2.13 -0.01 1.38 0.80 
BR:IU4 2010-3 2.46 0.63 6.92 4.60 2.13 0.00 1.38 0.80 
BR:IU4 2010-4 2.32 0.82 5.33 5.58 2.13 0.05 1.45 0.80 
BR:IU4 2011-1 2.46 0.95 4.23 6.10 3.28 0.22 1.50 0.87 
BR:IU4 2011-2 1.74 0.94 3.32 6.59 3.28 0.02 1.58 0.87 
BR:IU4 2011-3 1.76 0.94 2.12 7.14 3.28 0.04 1.62 0.87 
BR:IU4 2011-4 1.94 0.97 1.37 6.70 3.28 -0.17 1.40 0.87 
BR:IU4 2012-1 2.19 1.05 0.80 5.77 2.65 0.07 1.25 0.89 
BR:IU4 2012-2 1.70 0.91 0.55 5.00 2.65 0.01 1.27 0.89 
BR:IU4 2012-3 2.03 0.94 0.95 5.24 2.65 -0.09 1.14 0.89 
BR:IU4 2012-4 2.10 0.87 1.82 5.61 2.65 -0.01 1.14 0.89 
BR:IU4 2013-1 2.06 0.95 1.89 6.35 4.43 0.05 1.48 0.86 
BR:IU4 2013-2 2.96 0.88 3.46 6.56 4.43 0.01 1.51 0.86 
BR:IU4 2013-3 3.29 0.85 2.43 6.07 4.43 -0.11 1.33 0.86 
BR:IU4 2013-4 3.47 0.80 2.18 5.84 4.43 0.02 1.36 0.86 
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Bank Name 
BBV.ARGT.CLOM
B.  Colombia 
      
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
CB:GAN 2004-1 
 
0.56 6.29 6.23 2.19 0.32 
 
0.85 
CB:GAN 2004-2 0.28 1.13 4.40 5.64 2.19 0.04 0.00 0.85 
CB:GAN 2004-3 0.31 0.81 4.35 6.02 2.19 0.00 0.00 0.85 
CB:GAN 2004-4 0.30 0.80 6.30 5.74 2.19 0.02 0.00 0.85 
CB:GAN 2005-1 0.33 0.88 3.95 5.23 2.32 0.36 0.00 0.88 
CB:GAN 2005-2 0.21 0.51 6.10 4.96 2.32 -0.01 0.00 0.88 
CB:GAN 2005-3 0.21 0.64 5.42 4.93 2.32 0.02 0.00 0.88 
CB:GAN 2005-4 0.21 0.93 3.41 5.07 2.32 0.02 0.00 0.88 
CB:GAN 2006-1 -0.47 0.68 5.72 4.29 2.31 0.79 0.01 0.86 
CB:GAN 2006-2 -0.39 0.45 5.73 4.03 2.31 -0.01 0.01 0.86 
CB:GAN 2006-3 -0.45 0.42 7.66 4.54 2.31 -0.11 0.01 0.86 
CB:GAN 2006-4 -0.45 0.45 7.64 4.33 2.31 0.07 0.01 0.86 
CB:GAN 2007-1 0.09 0.45 7.59 5.25 2.30 0.38 0.01 0.81 
CB:GAN 2007-2 0.06 0.46 6.30 6.17 2.30 0.02 0.01 0.81 
CB:GAN 2007-3 0.05 0.41 6.09 5.33 2.30 0.11 0.01 0.81 
CB:GAN 2007-4 0.06 0.30 7.63 5.42 2.30 -0.03 0.01 0.81 
CB:GAN 2008-1 -0.59 0.41 5.27 6.09 2.10 0.21 0.01 0.82 
CB:GAN 2008-2 -0.34 0.43 5.54 6.43 2.10 0.10 0.01 0.82 
CB:GAN 2008-3 -0.25 0.33 3.59 7.65 2.10 0.04 0.01 0.82 
78 
CB:GAN 2008-4 -0.28 0.80 -0.03 7.78 2.10 -0.18 0.01 0.82 
CB:GAN 2009-1 -0.04 1.02 0.95 6.60 2.04 -0.15 0.01 0.82 
CB:GAN 2009-2 -0.05 0.69 0.75 4.77 2.04 -0.08 0.01 0.82 
CB:GAN 2009-3 -0.04 0.30 1.12 3.20 2.04 0.17 0.01 0.82 
CB:GAN 2009-4 -0.04 0.27 2.99 2.36 2.04 0.09 0.01 0.82 
CB:GAN 2010-1 0.29 0.29 4.08 2.01 2.46 0.14 0.02 0.79 
CB:GAN 2010-2 0.29 0.42 4.73 2.10 2.46 0.07 0.02 0.79 
CB:GAN 2010-3 0.32 0.43 3.56 2.28 2.46 0.02 0.02 0.79 
CB:GAN 2010-4 0.28 1.05 4.79 2.70 2.46 0.05 0.02 0.79 
CB:GAN 2011-1 -0.30 1.29 5.11 3.25 2.48 0.17 0.02 0.74 
CB:GAN 2011-2 -0.46 1.32 NA 3.03 2.48 0.02 0.02 0.74 
CB:GAN 2011-3 -0.43 2.04 NA 3.47 2.48 0.06 0.02 0.74 
CB:GAN 2011-4 -0.41 2.43 NA 3.90 2.48 -0.09 0.02 0.74 
CB:GAN 2012-1 -0.69 2.42 NA 3.50 1.94 0.15 0.02 0.78 
CB:GAN 2012-2 -0.57 1.85 NA 3.35 1.94 0.08 0.02 0.78 
CB:GAN 2012-3 -0.57 1.75 NA 3.07 1.94 0.00 0.02 0.78 
CB:GAN 2012-4 -0.58 0.90 NA 2.76 1.94 -0.01 0.02 0.78 
CB:GAN 2013-1 -0.73 0.85 NA 1.91 1.93 0.25 0.02 0.72 
CB:GAN 2013-2 -0.24 0.59 NA 2.06 1.93 -0.03 0.02 0.72 
CB:GAN 2013-3 -0.25 0.51 NA 2.25 1.93 -0.05 0.02 0.72 
CB:GAN 2013-4 -0.25 0.20 NA 1.85 1.93 0.01 0.02 0.72 
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Bank 
Name 
BANK 
PERMATA Indonesia 
      
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
ID:BKB 2004-1 13.42 2.69 4.10 4.84 2.34 0.28 NA 0.83 
ID:BKB 2004-2 6.52 2.04 4.39 6.40 2.34 -0.01 0.01 0.83 
ID:BKB 2004-3 7.18 1.75 4.50 6.72 2.34 -0.06 0.01 0.83 
ID:BKB 2004-4 7.13 3.35 7.16 6.27 2.34 0.00 0.01 0.83 
ID:BKB 2005-1 2.20 0.96 5.96 7.76 1.22 0.45 0.00 0.89 
ID:BKB 2005-2 0.79 0.87 5.87 7.65 1.22 -0.02 0.00 0.89 
ID:BKB 2005-3 0.76 -0.68 5.84 8.41 1.22 -0.03 0.00 0.89 
ID:BKB 2005-4 0.85 0.17 5.11 17.79 1.22 -0.05 0.00 0.89 
ID:BKB 2006-1 4.75 0.37 5.13 16.90 1.15 0.07 0.00 0.90 
ID:BKB 2006-2 0.76 0.19 4.93 15.51 1.15 0.08 0.00 0.90 
ID:BKB 2006-3 0.79 -0.33 5.86 14.87 1.15 -0.01 0.00 0.90 
ID:BKB 2006-4 0.78 -0.05 6.06 6.05 1.15 -0.01 0.00 0.90 
ID:BKB 2007-1 0.68 1.34 6.06 6.36 1.61 0.10 0.01 0.85 
ID:BKB 2007-2 0.64 1.28 6.73 5.81 1.61 -0.01 0.01 0.85 
ID:BKB 2007-3 0.62 1.17 6.74 5.56 1.61 0.01 0.01 0.85 
ID:BKB 2007-4 0.65 0.58 5.84 5.45 1.61 -0.01 0.01 0.85 
ID:BKB 2008-1 0.35 0.54 6.22 5.86 1.21 0.35 0.01 0.89 
ID:BKB 2008-2 0.47 0.15 6.30 8.61 1.21 0.02 0.01 0.89 
ID:BKB 2008-3 0.48 0.17 6.25 11.97 1.21 0.00 0.01 0.89 
ID:BKB 2008-4 0.41 0.36 5.28 11.50 1.21 -0.02 0.01 0.89 
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ID:BKB 2009-1 0.44 0.43 4.52 8.56 1.16 0.02 0.01 0.89 
ID:BKB 2009-2 0.33 0.46 4.14 5.65 1.16 -0.05 0.01 0.89 
ID:BKB 2009-3 0.28 0.33 4.27 2.75 1.16 0.13 0.01 0.89 
ID:BKB 2009-4 0.29 0.62 5.60 2.58 1.16 0.06 0.01 0.89 
ID:BKB 2010-1 1.14 0.64 5.99 3.65 2.00 0.35 0.01 0.84 
ID:BKB 2010-2 1.23 0.85 6.29 4.38 2.00 0.03 0.01 0.84 
ID:BKB 2010-3 1.27 0.84 5.81 6.16 2.00 0.00 0.01 0.84 
ID:BKB 2010-4 1.23 1.06 6.81 6.32 2.00 0.01 0.01 0.84 
ID:BKB 2011-1 1.45 0.64 6.45 6.83 1.64 0.34 0.01 0.84 
ID:BKB 2011-2 1.52 0.68 6.52 5.88 1.64 0.03 0.01 0.84 
ID:BKB 2011-3 1.46 2.31 6.49 4.65 1.64 0.02 0.02 0.84 
ID:BKB 2011-4 1.39 1.48 6.44 4.11 1.64 -0.04 0.01 0.84 
ID:BKB 2012-1 1.26 1.26 6.32 3.67 1.57 0.34 0.02 0.83 
ID:BKB 2012-2 0.92 1.00 6.39 4.37 1.57 0.00 0.02 0.83 
ID:BKB 2012-3 0.92 0.97 6.21 4.04 1.57 -0.03 0.02 0.83 
ID:BKB 2012-4 0.94 0.38 6.18 3.85 1.57 -0.02 0.02 0.83 
ID:BKB 2013-1 0.92 0.38 6.03 4.49 1.51 0.10 0.02 0.84 
ID:BKB 2013-2 0.97 0.70 5.76 5.06 1.51 -0.01 0.02 0.84 
ID:BKB 2013-3 0.86 0.75 5.63 8.02 1.51 -0.02 0.02 0.84 
ID:BKB 2013-4 0.93 0.96 5.72 8.03 1.51 -0.14 0.01 0.84 
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Bank 
Name 
BANK 
DANAMON 
INDONESIA Indonesia 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
ID:BKD 2004-1 
 
1.69 4.10 4.84 4.51 0.25 NA 0.55 
ID:BKD 2004-2 -1.74 1.26 4.39 6.40 4.51 -0.01 0.04 0.55 
ID:BKD 2004-3 -1.92 1.06 4.50 6.72 4.51 -0.06 0.04 0.55 
ID:BKD 2004-4 -1.90 1.35 7.16 6.27 4.51 0.00 0.04 0.55 
ID:BKD 2005-1 -4.03 0.76 5.96 7.76 3.32 0.34 0.03 0.67 
ID:BKD 2005-2 4.57 0.50 5.87 7.65 3.32 -0.02 0.03 0.67 
ID:BKD 2005-3 4.41 1.03 5.84 8.41 3.32 -0.03 0.03 0.67 
ID:BKD 2005-4 4.94 1.25 5.11 17.79 3.32 -0.05 0.03 0.67 
ID:BKD 2006-1 6.86 1.50 5.13 16.90 1.88 0.19 0.02 0.80 
ID:BKD 2006-2 0.59 1.28 4.93 15.51 1.88 0.08 0.02 0.80 
ID:BKD 2006-3 0.62 1.69 5.86 14.87 1.88 -0.01 0.02 0.80 
ID:BKD 2006-4 0.61 1.78 6.06 6.05 1.88 -0.01 0.02 0.80 
ID:BKD 2007-1 0.83 2.20 6.06 6.36 1.90 0.24 0.03 0.76 
ID:BKD 2007-2 0.91 2.20 6.73 5.81 1.90 -0.01 0.03 0.76 
ID:BKD 2007-3 0.88 2.33 6.74 5.56 1.90 0.01 0.03 0.76 
ID:BKD 2007-4 0.92 2.26 5.84 5.45 1.90 -0.01 0.03 0.76 
ID:BKD 2008-1 0.64 2.22 6.22 5.86 1.92 0.22 0.02 0.85 
ID:BKD 2008-2 0.84 1.23 6.30 8.61 1.92 0.02 0.02 0.85 
ID:BKD 2008-3 0.85 1.25 6.25 11.97 1.92 0.00 0.02 0.85 
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ID:BKD 2008-4 0.73 0.44 5.28 11.50 1.92 -0.02 0.02 0.85 
ID:BKD 2009-1 1.65 0.42 4.52 8.56 1.79 -0.19 0.02 0.86 
ID:BKD 2009-2 0.58 0.44 4.14 5.65 1.79 -0.05 0.02 0.86 
ID:BKD 2009-3 0.49 0.97 4.27 2.75 1.79 0.13 0.02 0.86 
ID:BKD 2009-4 0.51 0.89 5.60 2.58 1.79 0.06 0.02 0.86 
ID:BKD 2010-1 0.58 0.95 5.99 3.65 2.99 0.38 0.04 0.76 
ID:BKD 2010-2 0.74 0.98 6.29 4.38 2.99 0.03 0.04 0.76 
ID:BKD 2010-3 0.77 0.96 5.81 6.16 2.99 0.00 0.04 0.76 
ID:BKD 2010-4 0.75 1.86 6.81 6.32 2.99 0.01 0.04 0.76 
ID:BKD 2011-1 0.96 1.87 6.45 6.83 3.16 0.25 0.04 0.76 
ID:BKD 2011-2 0.94 1.64 6.52 5.88 3.16 0.03 0.04 0.76 
ID:BKD 2011-3 0.91 0.91 6.49 4.65 3.16 0.02 0.04 0.76 
ID:BKD 2011-4 0.86 1.36 6.44 4.11 3.16 -0.04 0.04 0.76 
ID:BKD 2012-1 0.96 1.27 6.32 3.67 3.37 0.05 0.05 0.74 
ID:BKD 2012-2 0.81 1.31 6.39 4.37 3.37 0.00 0.05 0.74 
ID:BKD 2012-3 0.81 1.28 6.21 4.04 3.37 -0.03 0.05 0.74 
ID:BKD 2012-4 0.83 1.56 6.18 3.85 3.37 -0.02 0.04 0.74 
ID:BKD 2013-1 1.16 1.53 6.03 4.49 3.48 0.17 0.04 0.79 
ID:BKD 2013-2 0.87 1.42 5.76 5.06 3.48 -0.01 0.04 0.79 
ID:BKD 2013-3 0.77 1.47 5.63 8.02 3.48 -0.02 0.04 0.79 
ID:BKD 2013-4 0.83 1.75 5.72 8.03 3.48 -0.14 0.04 0.79 
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Bank 
Name 
BANK 
INTL.INDONESIA  Indonesia 
      
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
ID:BKJ 2004-1 NA 2.61 4.10 4.84 2.66 0.48 NA 0.80 
ID:BKJ 2004-2 2.29 3.40 4.39 6.40 2.66 -0.01 0.00 0.80 
ID:BKJ 2004-3 2.52 2.96 4.50 6.72 2.66 -0.06 0.00 0.80 
ID:BKJ 2004-4 2.51 1.29 7.16 6.27 2.66 0.00 0.00 0.80 
ID:BKJ 2005-1 -0.04 0.83 5.96 7.76 2.42 0.51 0.00 0.83 
ID:BKJ 2005-2 -0.04 1.13 5.87 7.65 2.42 -0.02 0.00 0.83 
ID:BKJ 2005-3 -0.04 1.11 5.84 8.41 2.42 -0.03 0.00 0.83 
ID:BKJ 2005-4 -0.04 0.39 5.11 17.79 2.42 -0.05 0.00 0.83 
ID:BKJ 2006-1 2.53 1.05 5.13 16.90 2.00 0.16 0.00 0.90 
ID:BKJ 2006-2 0.53 0.93 4.93 15.51 2.00 0.08 0.00 0.90 
ID:BKJ 2006-3 0.55 0.80 5.86 14.87 2.00 -0.01 0.00 0.90 
ID:BKJ 2006-4 0.54 0.67 6.06 6.05 2.00 -0.01 0.00 0.90 
ID:BKJ 2007-1 0.67 1.23 6.06 6.36 2.02 0.17 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKJ 2007-2 0.54 1.45 6.73 5.81 2.02 -0.01 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKJ 2007-3 0.52 0.77 6.74 5.56 2.02 0.01 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKJ 2007-4 0.55 0.92 5.84 5.45 2.02 -0.01 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKJ 2008-1 0.43 0.94 6.22 5.86 2.07 0.13 0.00 0.94 
ID:BKJ 2008-2 0.39 -0.51 6.30 8.61 2.07 0.02 0.00 0.94 
ID:BKJ 2008-3 0.40 -0.49 6.25 11.97 2.07 0.00 0.00 0.94 
ID:BKJ 2008-4 0.34 0.20 5.28 11.50 2.07 -0.02 0.00 0.94 
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ID:BKJ 2009-1 1.26 0.10 4.52 8.56 1.05 -0.11 0.00 1.00 
ID:BKJ 2009-2 1.04 0.14 4.14 5.65 1.05 -0.05 0.00 1.00 
ID:BKJ 2009-3 0.87 0.16 4.27 2.75 1.05 0.13 0.00 1.00 
ID:BKJ 2009-4 0.91 0.04 5.60 2.58 1.05 0.06 0.00 1.00 
ID:BKJ 2010-1 0.55 -0.03 5.99 3.65 1.32 0.45 0.00 0.91 
ID:BKJ 2010-2 0.65 0.25 6.29 4.38 1.32 0.03 0.00 0.91 
ID:BKJ 2010-3 0.67 0.27 5.81 6.16 1.32 0.00 0.00 0.91 
ID:BKJ 2010-4 0.65 0.56 6.81 6.32 1.32 0.01 0.00 0.91 
ID:BKJ 2011-1 0.92 0.09 6.45 6.83 1.46 0.26 0.00 0.91 
ID:BKJ 2011-2 1.03 0.04 6.52 5.88 1.46 0.03 0.00 0.91 
ID:BKJ 2011-3 1.00 0.34 6.49 4.65 1.46 0.02 0.00 0.91 
ID:BKJ 2011-4 0.95 1.28 6.44 4.11 1.46 -0.04 0.00 0.91 
ID:BKJ 2012-1 0.89 1.16 6.32 3.67 1.81 0.18 0.00 0.86 
ID:BKJ 2012-2 0.84 1.27 6.39 4.37 1.81 0.00 0.00 0.86 
ID:BKJ 2012-3 0.84 1.25 6.21 4.04 1.81 -0.03 0.00 0.86 
ID:BKJ 2012-4 0.86 1.39 6.18 3.85 1.81 -0.02 0.00 0.86 
ID:BKJ 2013-1 0.84 1.54 6.03 4.49 NA 0.10 0.00 0.83 
ID:BKJ 2013-2 1.19 1.47 5.76 5.06 NA -0.01 0.00 0.83 
ID:BKJ 2013-3 1.05 1.51 5.63 8.02 NA -0.02 0.00 0.83 
ID:BKJ 2013-4 1.13 1.05 5.72 8.03 NA -0.14 0.00 0.83 
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Bank 
Name 
BANK 
MANDIRI Indonesia 
      
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
ID:BKM 2004-1 0.66 
 
4.10 4.84 2.47 0.25 NA 0.73 
ID:BKM 2004-2 2.35 -2.93 4.39 6.40 2.47 -0.01 0.03 0.73 
ID:BKM 2004-3 2.59 2.48 4.50 6.72 2.47 -0.06 0.03 0.73 
ID:BKM 2004-4 2.57 2.49 7.16 6.27 2.47 0.00 0.03 0.73 
ID:BKM 2005-1 2.29 1.73 5.96 7.76 0.44 0.18 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKM 2005-2 0.16 2.01 5.87 7.65 0.44 -0.02 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKM 2005-3 0.16 2.25 5.84 8.41 0.44 -0.03 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKM 2005-4 0.17 2.00 5.11 17.79 0.44 -0.05 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKM 2006-1 0.29 2.13 5.13 16.90 1.17 0.03 0.01 0.91 
ID:BKM 2006-2 0.25 1.82 4.93 15.51 1.17 0.08 0.01 0.91 
ID:BKM 2006-3 0.26 1.54 5.86 14.87 1.17 -0.01 0.01 0.91 
ID:BKM 2006-4 0.26 1.77 6.06 6.05 1.17 -0.01 0.01 0.91 
ID:BKM 2007-1 0.90 1.73 6.06 6.36 1.71 0.26 0.02 0.77 
ID:BKM 2007-2 1.70 1.82 6.73 5.81 1.71 -0.01 0.02 0.77 
ID:BKM 2007-3 1.63 1.52 6.74 5.56 1.71 0.01 0.02 0.77 
ID:BKM 2007-4 1.71 1.66 5.84 5.45 1.71 -0.01 0.02 0.77 
ID:BKM 2008-1 1.47 1.62 6.22 5.86 1.87 0.31 0.03 0.75 
ID:BKM 2008-2 1.40 1.01 6.30 8.61 1.87 0.02 0.03 0.75 
ID:BKM 2008-3 1.42 1.08 6.25 11.97 1.87 0.00 0.03 0.75 
ID:BKM 2008-4 1.21 0.46 5.28 11.50 1.87 -0.02 0.03 0.75 
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ID:BKM 2009-1 0.00 0.42 4.52 8.56 2.16 0.01 0.03 0.73 
ID:BKM 2009-2 0.00 0.46 4.14 5.65 2.16 -0.05 0.03 0.73 
ID:BKM 2009-3 0.00 0.65 4.27 2.75 2.16 0.13 0.03 0.73 
ID:BKM 2009-4 0.00 0.80 5.60 2.58 2.16 0.06 0.04 0.73 
ID:BKM 2010-1 1.77 0.85 5.99 3.65 2.47 0.18 0.05 0.69 
ID:BKM 2010-2 1.07 0.83 6.29 4.38 2.47 0.03 0.05 0.69 
ID:BKM 2010-3 1.10 0.82 5.81 6.16 2.47 0.00 0.05 0.69 
ID:BKM 2010-4 1.07 1.27 6.81 6.32 2.47 0.01 0.05 0.69 
ID:BKM 2011-1 1.06 1.36 6.45 6.83 2.62 0.31 0.06 0.70 
ID:BKM 2011-2 0.75 1.32 6.52 5.88 2.62 0.03 0.06 0.70 
ID:BKM 2011-3 0.73 1.57 6.49 4.65 2.62 0.02 0.06 0.70 
ID:BKM 2011-4 0.69 1.14 6.44 4.11 2.62 -0.04 0.06 0.70 
ID:BKM 2012-1 0.44 1.11 6.32 3.67 2.80 0.16 0.07 0.68 
ID:BKM 2012-2 0.43 1.11 6.39 4.37 2.80 0.00 0.07 0.68 
ID:BKM 2012-3 0.44 1.12 6.21 4.04 2.80 -0.03 0.07 0.68 
ID:BKM 2012-4 0.44 1.25 6.18 3.85 2.80 -0.02 0.07 0.68 
ID:BKM 2013-1 0.88 1.23 6.03 4.49 2.86 0.18 0.08 0.61 
ID:BKM 2013-2 0.63 1.32 5.76 5.06 2.86 -0.01 0.08 0.61 
ID:BKM 2013-3 0.56 1.50 5.63 8.02 2.86 -0.02 0.08 0.61 
ID:BKM 2013-4 0.60 1.37 5.72 8.03 2.86 -0.14 0.07 0.61 
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Bank 
Name 
BANK QNB 
INDONESIA  Indonesia 
      
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
ID:BKT 2004-1 NA -2.38 4.10 4.84 0.40 0.42 NA 0.98 
ID:BKT 2004-2 0.46 -1.84 4.39 6.40 0.40 -0.01 0.00 0.98 
ID:BKT 2004-3 0.51 -1.91 4.50 6.72 0.40 -0.06 0.00 0.98 
ID:BKT 2004-4 0.50 -2.00 7.16 6.27 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.98 
ID:BKT 2005-1 0.72 -1.21 5.96 7.76 0.60 0.11 0.00 0.98 
ID:BKT 2005-2 1.68 -2.27 5.87 7.65 0.60 -0.02 0.00 0.98 
ID:BKT 2005-3 1.62 -1.00 5.84 8.41 0.60 -0.03 0.00 0.98 
ID:BKT 2005-4 1.82 -0.62 5.11 17.79 0.60 -0.05 0.00 0.98 
ID:BKT 2006-1 1.12 0.38 5.13 16.90 0.43 0.69 0.00 0.97 
ID:BKT 2006-2 0.86 0.41 4.93 15.51 0.43 0.08 0.00 0.97 
ID:BKT 2006-3 0.90 0.29 5.86 14.87 0.43 -0.01 0.00 0.97 
ID:BKT 2006-4 0.88 0.30 6.06 6.05 0.43 -0.01 0.00 0.97 
ID:BKT 2007-1 0.07 0.49 6.06 6.36 0.30 -0.01 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2007-2 0.04 0.44 6.73 5.81 0.30 -0.01 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2007-3 0.04 -0.26 6.74 5.56 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2007-4 0.04 -0.15 5.84 5.45 0.30 -0.01 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2008-1 1.13 -0.19 6.22 5.86 0.15 0.24 0.00 1.03 
ID:BKT 2008-2 1.32 -0.41 6.30 8.61 0.15 0.02 0.00 1.03 
ID:BKT 2008-3 1.33 -0.38 6.25 11.97 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.03 
ID:BKT 2008-4 1.14 -0.32 5.28 11.50 0.15 -0.02 0.00 1.03 
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ID:BKT 2009-1 -0.06 -0.28 4.52 8.56 0.18 -0.19 0.00 0.97 
ID:BKT 2009-2 -0.14 -0.32 4.14 5.65 0.18 -0.05 0.00 0.97 
ID:BKT 2009-3 -0.12 -0.10 4.27 2.75 0.18 0.13 0.00 0.97 
ID:BKT 2009-4 -0.12 0.01 5.60 2.58 0.18 0.06 0.00 0.97 
ID:BKT 2010-1 -1.49 0.03 5.99 3.65 0.05 0.33 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2010-2 -0.82 0.12 6.29 4.38 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2010-3 -0.85 0.13 5.81 6.16 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2010-4 -0.83 0.59 6.81 6.32 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2011-1 -0.01 0.24 6.45 6.83 0.20 0.32 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2011-2 -0.08 -0.09 6.52 5.88 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2011-3 -0.07 0.15 6.49 4.65 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2011-4 -0.07 0.26 6.44 4.11 0.20 -0.04 0.00 0.95 
ID:BKT 2012-1 -3.08 0.12 6.32 3.67 -0.57 0.32 0.00 1.12 
ID:BKT 2012-2 0.97 0.10 6.39 4.37 -0.57 0.00 0.00 1.12 
ID:BKT 2012-3 0.98 0.05 6.21 4.04 -0.57 -0.03 0.00 1.12 
ID:BKT 2012-4 1.00 -0.01 6.18 3.85 -0.57 -0.02 0.00 1.12 
ID:BKT 2013-1 0.87 0.10 6.03 4.49 0.04 1.51 0.00 1.00 
ID:BKT 2013-2 0.99 0.07 5.76 5.06 0.04 -0.01 0.00 1.00 
ID:BKT 2013-3 0.87 0.19 5.63 8.02 0.04 -0.02 0.00 1.00 
ID:BKT 2013-4 0.94 0.76 5.72 8.03 0.04 -0.14 0.00 1.00 
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Bank 
Name 
BANK CIMB 
NIAGA  Indonesia 
      
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
ID:BKN 2004-1 0.57 2.41 4.10 4.84 2.90 0.43 NA 0.79 
ID:BKN 2004-2 0.63 1.63 4.39 6.40 2.90 -0.01 0.01 0.79 
ID:BKN 2004-3 0.69 1.16 4.50 6.72 2.90 -0.06 0.01 0.79 
ID:BKN 2004-4 0.69 0.65 7.16 6.27 2.90 0.00 0.01 0.79 
ID:BKN 2005-1 0.80 1.44 5.96 7.76 2.06 0.35 0.01 0.82 
ID:BKN 2005-2 1.21 1.10 5.87 7.65 2.06 -0.02 0.01 0.82 
ID:BKN 2005-3 1.17 0.81 5.84 8.41 2.06 -0.03 0.01 0.82 
ID:BKN 2005-4 1.31 2.02 5.11 17.79 2.06 -0.05 0.01 0.82 
ID:BKN 2006-1 0.68 2.06 5.13 16.90 1.82 0.17 0.01 0.82 
ID:BKN 2006-2 0.31 2.11 4.93 15.51 1.82 0.08 0.01 0.82 
ID:BKN 2006-3 0.33 1.34 5.86 14.87 1.82 -0.01 0.01 0.82 
ID:BKN 2006-4 0.32 1.42 6.06 6.05 1.82 -0.01 0.01 0.82 
ID:BKN 2007-1 0.42 1.38 6.06 6.36 1.89 0.31 0.01 0.83 
ID:BKN 2007-2 0.30 1.62 6.73 5.81 1.89 -0.01 0.01 0.83 
ID:BKN 2007-3 0.29 0.97 6.74 5.56 1.89 0.01 0.01 0.83 
ID:BKN 2007-4 0.31 0.83 5.84 5.45 1.89 -0.01 0.01 0.83 
ID:BKN 2008-1 0.76 0.82 6.22 5.86 0.92 0.73 0.00 0.88 
ID:BKN 2008-2 0.37 0.88 6.30 8.61 0.92 0.02 0.00 0.88 
ID:BKN 2008-3 0.37 0.88 6.25 11.97 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.88 
ID:BKN 2008-4 0.32 0.92 5.28 11.50 0.92 -0.02 0.00 0.88 
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ID:BKN 2009-1 0.10 0.86 4.52 8.56 1.73 -0.08 0.01 0.83 
ID:BKN 2009-2 0.12 0.97 4.14 5.65 1.73 -0.05 0.01 0.83 
ID:BKN 2009-3 0.10 0.85 4.27 2.75 1.73 0.13 0.01 0.83 
ID:BKN 2009-4 0.10 0.84 5.60 2.58 1.73 0.06 0.01 0.83 
ID:BKN 2010-1 0.57 0.88 5.99 3.65 2.23 0.38 0.01 0.76 
ID:BKN 2010-2 0.57 0.93 6.29 4.38 2.23 0.03 0.01 0.76 
ID:BKN 2010-3 0.59 0.94 5.81 6.16 2.23 0.00 0.01 0.76 
ID:BKN 2010-4 0.57 0.84 6.81 6.32 2.23 0.01 0.01 0.76 
ID:BKN 2011-1 0.45 0.16 6.45 6.83 2.39 0.14 0.01 0.75 
ID:BKN 2011-2 0.60 0.22 6.52 5.88 2.39 0.03 0.02 0.75 
ID:BKN 2011-3 0.58 0.58 6.49 4.65 2.39 0.02 0.02 0.75 
ID:BKN 2011-4 0.55 1.89 6.44 4.11 2.39 -0.04 0.01 0.75 
ID:BKN 2012-1 0.32 1.84 6.32 3.67 2.70 0.18 0.02 0.70 
ID:BKN 2012-2 0.26 1.71 6.39 4.37 2.70 0.00 0.02 0.70 
ID:BKN 2012-3 0.26 1.72 6.21 4.04 2.70 -0.03 0.02 0.70 
ID:BKN 2012-4 0.26 1.92 6.18 3.85 2.70 -0.02 0.02 0.70 
ID:BKN 2013-1 0.43 2.00 6.03 4.49 2.54 0.00 0.02 0.72 
ID:BKN 2013-2 0.40 2.22 5.76 5.06 2.50 -0.01 0.02 0.72 
ID:BKN 2013-3 0.36 2.20 5.63 8.02 2.50 -0.02 0.02 0.72 
ID:BKN 2013-4 0.38 1.80 5.72 8.03 2.50 -0.14 0.02 0.72 
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Bank 
Name 
BANK ARTHA 
GRAHA INTSL.  Indonesia 
      
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
ID:IPA 2004-1 NA 1.94 4.10 4.84 24.17 -0.83 NA -1.29 
ID:IPA 2004-2 -7.21 4.10 4.39 6.40 24.17 -0.01 0.01 -1.29 
ID:IPA 2004-3 -7.94 4.23 4.50 6.72 24.17 -0.06 0.01 -1.29 
ID:IPA 2004-4 -7.88 3.93 7.16 6.27 24.17 0.00 0.01 -1.29 
ID:IPA 2005-1 -0.28 3.74 5.96 7.76 0.96 51.26 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2005-2 2.97 5.15 5.87 7.65 0.96 -0.02 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2005-3 2.87 7.19 5.84 8.41 0.96 -0.03 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2005-4 3.21 3.09 5.11 17.79 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2006-1 0.11 3.00 5.13 16.90 0.55 -0.04 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2006-2 0.04 3.30 4.93 15.51 0.55 0.08 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2006-3 0.06 3.19 5.86 14.87 0.55 -0.01 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2006-4 0.08 2.22 6.06 6.05 0.55 -0.01 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2007-1 0.36 1.33 6.06 6.36 0.20 0.05 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2007-2 1.39 1.42 6.73 5.81 0.20 -0.01 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2007-3 1.37 -0.36 6.74 5.56 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2007-4 1.50 -0.28 5.84 5.45 0.20 -0.01 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2008-1 0.24 -0.32 6.22 5.86 0.18 0.26 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2008-2 9.11 0.06 6.30 8.61 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2008-3 9.11 0.22 6.25 11.97 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.97 
ID:IPA 2008-4 7.79 0.09 5.28 11.50 0.18 -0.02 0.00 0.97 
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ID:IPA 2009-1 9.63 -0.24 4.52 8.56 0.30 0.02 0.00 0.96 
ID:IPA 2009-2 0.05 -0.16 4.14 5.65 0.30 -0.05 0.00 0.96 
ID:IPA 2009-3 0.05 0.49 4.27 2.75 0.30 0.13 0.00 0.96 
ID:IPA 2009-4 0.05 0.56 5.60 2.58 0.30 0.06 0.00 0.96 
ID:IPA 2010-1 0.88 0.65 5.99 3.65 0.52 0.17 0.00 0.92 
ID:IPA 2010-2 1.41 0.53 6.29 4.38 0.52 0.03 0.00 0.92 
ID:IPA 2010-3 1.45 0.51 5.81 6.16 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.92 
ID:IPA 2010-4 1.41 0.79 6.81 6.32 0.52 0.01 0.00 0.92 
ID:IPA 2011-1 -0.19 1.32 6.45 6.83 0.56 0.15 0.00 0.93 
ID:IPA 2011-2 -0.05 1.33 6.52 5.88 0.56 0.03 0.00 0.93 
ID:IPA 2011-3 -0.05 1.92 6.49 4.65 0.56 0.02 0.00 0.93 
ID:IPA 2011-4 -0.04 1.44 6.44 4.11 0.56 -0.04 0.00 0.93 
ID:IPA 2012-1 0.02 1.63 6.32 3.67 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.93 
ID:IPA 2012-2 0.02 1.94 6.39 4.37 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.93 
ID:IPA 2012-3 0.02 1.85 6.21 4.04 0.68 -0.03 0.00 0.93 
ID:IPA 2012-4 0.02 0.91 6.18 3.85 0.68 -0.02 0.00 0.93 
ID:IPA 2013-1 0.51 0.88 6.03 4.49 1.18 0.02 0.00 0.85 
ID:IPA 2013-2 0.95 0.72 5.76 5.06 1.18 -0.01 0.00 0.85 
ID:IPA 2013-3 0.84 0.88 5.63 8.02 1.18 -0.02 0.00 0.85 
ID:IPA 2013-4 0.90 1.20 5.72 8.03 1.18 -0.14 0.00 0.85 
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Bank 
Name BANK MEGA Indonesia 
      
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
ID:MEG 2004-1 0.67 0.06 4.10 4.84 2.01 0.17 NA 0.74 
ID:MEG 2004-2 0.08 0.01 4.39 6.40 2.01 -0.01 0.01 0.74 
ID:MEG 2004-3 0.09 0.07 4.50 6.72 2.01 -0.06 0.01 0.74 
ID:MEG 2004-4 0.09 0.22 7.16 6.27 2.01 0.00 0.01 0.74 
ID:MEG 2005-1 0.13 0.09 5.96 7.76 1.98 0.63 0.00 0.89 
ID:MEG 2005-2 0.15 -0.14 5.87 7.65 1.98 -0.02 0.00 0.89 
ID:MEG 2005-3 0.14 0.16 5.84 8.41 1.98 -0.03 0.00 0.89 
ID:MEG 2005-4 0.16 0.56 5.11 17.79 1.98 -0.05 0.00 0.89 
ID:MEG 2006-1 0.76 0.74 5.13 16.90 1.94 0.02 0.00 0.93 
ID:MEG 2006-2 0.72 0.61 4.93 15.51 1.94 0.08 0.00 0.93 
ID:MEG 2006-3 0.75 0.34 5.86 14.87 1.94 -0.01 0.00 0.93 
ID:MEG 2006-4 0.73 -0.23 6.06 6.05 1.94 -0.01 0.00 0.93 
ID:MEG 2007-1 1.42 -0.77 6.06 6.36 1.63 0.32 0.01 0.79 
ID:MEG 2007-2 0.64 -0.75 6.73 5.81 1.63 -0.01 0.01 0.79 
ID:MEG 2007-3 0.62 0.02 6.74 5.56 1.63 0.01 0.01 0.79 
ID:MEG 2007-4 0.65 0.10 5.84 5.45 1.63 -0.01 0.01 0.79 
ID:MEG 2008-1 1.19 0.06 6.22 5.86 1.73 0.36 0.01 0.83 
ID:MEG 2008-2 0.68 0.45 6.30 8.61 1.73 0.02 0.01 0.83 
ID:MEG 2008-3 0.68 0.65 6.25 11.97 1.73 0.00 0.01 0.83 
ID:MEG 2008-4 0.59 -0.12 5.28 11.50 1.73 -0.02 0.01 0.83 
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ID:MEG 2009-1 0.84 -0.07 4.52 8.56 1.72 -0.19 0.01 0.83 
ID:MEG 2009-2 0.95 -0.12 4.14 5.65 1.72 -0.05 0.01 0.83 
ID:MEG 2009-3 0.80 -0.04 4.27 2.75 1.72 0.13 0.01 0.83 
ID:MEG 2009-4 0.83 -0.09 5.60 2.58 1.72 0.06 0.01 0.83 
ID:MEG 2010-1 1.46 -0.05 5.99 3.65 2.33 0.74 0.02 0.77 
ID:MEG 2010-2 1.31 -0.18 6.29 4.38 2.33 0.03 0.02 0.77 
ID:MEG 2010-3 1.35 -0.20 5.81 6.16 2.33 0.00 0.02 0.77 
ID:MEG 2010-4 1.31 0.31 6.81 6.32 2.33 0.01 0.02 0.77 
ID:MEG 2011-1 0.87 0.53 6.45 6.83 2.09 0.22 0.02 0.81 
ID:MEG 2011-2 0.62 0.43 6.52 5.88 2.09 0.03 0.02 0.81 
ID:MEG 2011-3 0.60 -0.26 6.49 4.65 2.09 0.02 0.02 0.81 
ID:MEG 2011-4 0.57 0.57 6.44 4.11 2.09 -0.04 0.02 0.81 
ID:MEG 2012-1 0.91 0.46 6.32 3.67 2.34 -0.17 0.02 0.77 
ID:MEG 2012-2 1.23 0.49 6.39 4.37 2.34 0.00 0.02 0.77 
ID:MEG 2012-3 1.24 0.67 6.21 4.04 2.34 -0.03 0.02 0.77 
ID:MEG 2012-4 1.26 0.69 6.18 3.85 2.34 -0.02 0.02 0.77 
ID:MEG 2013-1 -1.48 0.67 6.03 4.49 0.81 0.17 0.01 0.90 
ID:MEG 2013-2 -0.88 0.82 5.76 5.06 0.81 -0.01 0.01 0.90 
ID:MEG 2013-3 -0.78 0.63 5.63 8.02 0.81 -0.02 0.01 0.90 
ID:MEG 2013-4 -0.84 0.54 5.72 8.03 0.81 -0.14 0.01 0.90 
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Bank 
Name 
BANK OCBC 
NISP Indonesia 
      
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
ID:NIS 2004-1 0.01 0.93 4.10 4.84 2.77 0.17 NA 0.77 
ID:NIS 2004-2 0.03 0.74 4.39 6.40 2.77 -0.01 0.01 0.77 
ID:NIS 2004-3 0.03 0.92 4.50 6.72 2.77 -0.06 0.01 0.77 
ID:NIS 2004-4 0.03 1.96 7.16 6.27 2.77 0.00 0.01 0.77 
ID:NIS 2005-1 -0.38 1.82 5.96 7.76 1.96 0.19 0.01 0.86 
ID:NIS 2005-2 -0.15 1.72 5.87 7.65 1.96 -0.02 0.01 0.86 
ID:NIS 2005-3 -0.14 1.41 5.84 8.41 1.96 -0.03 0.01 0.86 
ID:NIS 2005-4 -0.16 1.68 5.11 17.79 1.96 -0.05 0.01 0.86 
ID:NIS 2006-1 0.50 1.51 5.13 16.90 1.63 0.24 0.01 0.88 
ID:NIS 2006-2 0.30 1.17 4.93 15.51 1.63 0.08 0.01 0.88 
ID:NIS 2006-3 0.32 1.02 5.86 14.87 1.63 -0.01 0.01 0.88 
ID:NIS 2006-4 0.31 1.00 6.06 6.05 1.63 -0.01 0.01 0.88 
ID:NIS 2007-1 0.77 0.16 6.06 6.36 1.33 0.30 0.01 0.88 
ID:NIS 2007-2 0.59 0.14 6.73 5.81 1.33 -0.01 0.01 0.88 
ID:NIS 2007-3 0.56 0.51 6.74 5.56 1.33 0.01 0.01 0.88 
ID:NIS 2007-4 0.59 0.38 5.84 5.45 1.33 -0.01 0.01 0.88 
ID:NIS 2008-1 0.07 0.42 6.22 5.86 1.29 0.11 0.01 0.86 
ID:NIS 2008-2 0.03 0.37 6.30 8.61 1.29 0.02 0.01 0.86 
ID:NIS 2008-3 0.04 0.38 6.25 11.97 1.29 0.00 0.01 0.86 
ID:NIS 2008-4 0.03 0.51 5.28 11.50 1.29 -0.02 0.01 0.86 
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ID:NIS 2009-1 0.05 0.47 4.52 8.56 1.42 -0.08 0.01 0.84 
ID:NIS 2009-2 0.05 0.46 4.14 5.65 1.42 -0.05 0.01 0.84 
ID:NIS 2009-3 0.04 0.36 4.27 2.75 1.42 0.13 0.01 0.84 
ID:NIS 2009-4 0.04 0.32 5.60 2.58 1.42 0.06 0.01 0.84 
ID:NIS 2010-1 0.69 0.35 5.99 3.65 1.03 0.33 0.01 0.84 
ID:NIS 2010-2 0.77 0.28 6.29 4.38 1.03 0.03 0.01 0.84 
ID:NIS 2010-3 0.80 0.27 5.81 6.16 1.03 0.00 0.01 0.84 
ID:NIS 2010-4 0.78 0.22 6.81 6.32 1.03 0.01 0.01 0.84 
ID:NIS 2011-1 0.77 0.16 6.45 6.83 1.63 0.38 0.01 0.79 
ID:NIS 2011-2 0.66 0.34 6.52 5.88 1.63 0.03 0.01 0.79 
ID:NIS 2011-3 0.64 1.05 6.49 4.65 1.63 0.02 0.01 0.79 
ID:NIS 2011-4 0.61 1.57 6.44 4.11 1.63 -0.04 0.01 0.79 
ID:NIS 2012-1 0.05 1.50 6.32 3.67 1.54 0.28 0.01 0.79 
ID:NIS 2012-2 0.04 1.84 6.39 4.37 1.54 0.00 0.01 0.79 
ID:NIS 2012-3 0.04 1.94 6.21 4.04 1.54 -0.03 0.01 0.79 
ID:NIS 2012-4 0.04 1.16 6.18 3.85 1.54 -0.02 0.01 0.79 
ID:NIS 2013-1 0.33 1.17 6.03 4.49 1.65 0.11 0.01 0.78 
ID:NIS 2013-2 0.36 1.04 5.76 5.06 1.65 -0.01 0.01 0.78 
ID:NIS 2013-3 0.32 1.28 5.63 8.02 1.65 -0.02 0.01 0.78 
ID:NIS 2013-4 0.34 1.16 5.72 8.03 1.65 -0.14 0.01 0.78 
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Bank 
Name 
CIMB GROUP 
HOLDINGS Malaysia 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
L:COMS 2004-1 -0.79 1.92 8.17 0.97 1.07 0.15 NA 0.86 
L:COMS 2004-2 -0.09 1.97 7.95 1.13 1.07 0.00 0.04 0.86 
L:COMS 2004-3 -0.09 1.86 6.37 1.43 1.07 0.00 0.04 0.86 
L:COMS 2004-4 -0.09 2.18 4.85 2.13 1.07 0.00 0.04 0.86 
L:COMS 2005-1 -0.08 2.31 5.96 2.43 1.16 0.04 0.04 0.86 
L:COMS 2005-2 -0.09 1.89 4.03 2.87 1.16 0.00 0.04 0.86 
L:COMS 2005-3 -0.09 1.60 5.39 3.37 1.16 0.00 0.04 0.86 
L:COMS 2005-4 -0.09 1.60 5.95 3.20 1.16 0.01 0.04 0.86 
L:COMS 2006-1 -0.06 1.59 5.63 3.73 1.80 0.44 0.07 0.84 
L:COMS 2006-2 -0.06 1.54 5.64 4.13 1.80 0.03 0.07 0.84 
L:COMS 2006-3 -0.06 1.93 5.71 3.57 1.80 0.01 0.07 0.84 
L:COMS 2006-4 -0.06 2.00 5.36 3.07 1.80 -0.01 0.07 0.84 
L:COMS 2007-1 -0.28 1.67 5.16 2.60 2.22 0.21 0.12 0.79 
L:COMS 2007-2 -0.21 1.57 5.94 1.43 2.22 0.02 0.12 0.79 
L:COMS 2007-3 -0.20 1.57 6.44 1.77 2.22 0.00 0.12 0.79 
L:COMS 2007-4 -0.22 1.71 7.57 2.20 2.22 0.01 0.12 0.79 
L:COMS 2008-1 -0.28 1.71 7.60 2.60 1.36 0.13 0.09 0.79 
L:COMS 2008-2 -0.47 0.99 6.62 4.83 1.36 0.03 0.09 0.79 
L:COMS 2008-3 -0.45 1.24 5.13 8.40 1.36 -0.02 0.09 0.79 
L:COMS 2008-4 -0.46 0.95 0.33 5.90 1.36 -0.06 0.08 0.79 
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L:COMS 2009-1 -0.56 0.87 -5.76 3.70 1.55 0.21 0.11 0.76 
L:COMS 2009-2 -0.47 0.56 -3.74 1.33 1.55 -0.03 0.11 0.76 
L:COMS 2009-3 -0.45 0.76 -1.13 -2.27 1.55 0.02 0.11 0.76 
L:COMS 2009-4 -0.46 0.96 4.46 -0.17 1.55 0.01 0.12 0.76 
L:COMS 2010-1 -0.44 1.10 10.29 1.27 1.64 0.13 0.15 0.74 
L:COMS 2010-2 -0.72 1.33 9.37 1.53 1.64 0.05 0.15 0.74 
L:COMS 2010-3 -0.71 1.02 5.51 1.80 1.64 0.01 0.15 0.74 
L:COMS 2010-4 -0.67 1.41 4.98 1.87 1.64 0.04 0.16 0.74 
L:COMS 2011-1 -0.68 1.28 5.22 2.77 1.71 0.17 0.18 0.75 
L:COMS 2011-2 -0.81 1.62 4.33 3.33 1.71 0.01 0.18 0.75 
L:COMS 2011-3 -0.81 1.63 5.81 3.37 1.71 0.01 0.18 0.75 
L:COMS 2011-4 -0.77 1.67 5.37 3.23 1.71 -0.06 0.17 0.75 
L:COMS 2012-1 -0.80 1.47 5.11 2.33 1.65 0.10 0.19 0.75 
L:COMS 2012-2 -1.14 1.45 5.65 1.73 1.65 0.03 0.19 0.75 
L:COMS 2012-3 -1.20 1.47 5.24 1.37 1.65 -0.03 0.18 0.75 
L:COMS 2012-4 -1.15 1.45 6.52 1.27 1.65 0.03 0.19 0.75 
L:COMS 2013-1 -1.13 1.39 4.24 1.47 1.52 0.05 0.20 0.77 
L:COMS 2013-2 -0.57 1.36 4.54 1.77 1.52 -0.02 0.20 0.77 
L:COMS 2013-3 -0.55 1.40 5.03 2.17 1.52 -0.03 0.19 0.77 
L:COMS 2013-4 -0.58 1.25 5.12 2.97 1.52 0.00 0.19 0.77 
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Bank 
Name 
HONG LEONG 
BANK Malaysia 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
L:HOLB 2004-1 -0.13 1.21 8.17 0.97 0.88 0.00 
 
0.78 
L:HOLB 2004-2 -0.13 0.83 7.95 1.13 0.88 0.00 0.06 0.78 
L:HOLB 2004-3 -0.23 0.95 6.37 1.43 0.88 -0.01 0.08 0.73 
L:HOLB 2004-4 -0.50 1.12 4.85 2.13 0.88 0.00 0.08 0.73 
L:HOLB 2005-1 -0.50 0.99 5.96 2.43 1.12 0.00 0.08 0.73 
L:HOLB 2005-2 -0.50 0.95 4.03 2.87 0.90 0.00 0.08 0.73 
L:HOLB 2005-3 -0.43 0.59 5.39 3.37 0.90 0.05 0.09 0.75 
L:HOLB 2005-4 -0.22 0.60 5.95 3.20 0.90 0.01 0.09 0.75 
L:HOLB 2006-1 -0.23 0.73 5.63 3.73 1.05 0.00 0.09 0.75 
L:HOLB 2006-2 -0.23 0.97 5.64 4.13 1.05 0.03 0.10 0.75 
L:HOLB 2006-3 -0.23 0.98 5.71 3.57 1.05 0.34 0.11 0.75 
L:HOLB 2006-4 -0.32 1.01 5.36 3.07 1.05 -0.01 0.11 0.75 
L:HOLB 2007-1 -0.32 0.57 5.16 2.60 1.05 0.05 0.12 0.75 
L:HOLB 2007-2 -0.32 0.51 5.94 1.43 1.05 0.02 0.12 0.75 
L:HOLB 2007-3 -0.33 0.52 6.44 1.77 1.12 0.04 0.14 0.72 
L:HOLB 2007-4 -0.35 0.62 7.57 2.20 1.12 0.01 0.15 0.72 
L:HOLB 2008-1 -0.35 0.64 7.60 2.60 1.12 0.04 0.15 0.72 
L:HOLB 2008-2 -0.33 0.42 6.62 4.83 1.12 0.03 0.15 0.72 
L:HOLB 2008-3 -0.41 0.39 5.13 8.40 1.29 -0.04 0.18 0.72 
L:HOLB 2008-4 -0.38 0.37 0.33 5.90 1.29 -0.06 0.17 0.72 
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L:HOLB 2009-1 -0.39 0.41 -5.76 3.70 1.29 0.00 0.17 0.72 
L:HOLB 2009-2 -0.42 0.36 -3.74 1.33 1.29 -0.03 0.17 0.72 
L:HOLB 2009-3 -0.34 0.38 -1.13 -2.27 2.46 0.12 0.19 0.68 
L:HOLB 2009-4 -0.45 0.49 4.46 -0.17 2.46 0.01 0.19 0.68 
L:HOLB 2010-1 -0.45 0.64 10.29 1.27 2.46 0.02 0.19 0.68 
L:HOLB 2010-2 -0.44 0.68 9.37 1.53 2.46 0.05 0.20 0.68 
L:HOLB 2010-3 -0.74 0.71 5.51 1.80 1.10 0.85 0.23 0.71 
L:HOLB 2010-4 -1.02 0.70 4.98 1.87 1.10 0.04 0.24 0.71 
L:HOLB 2011-1 -1.07 0.55 5.22 2.77 1.10 0.01 0.24 0.71 
L:HOLB 2011-2 -1.04 0.34 4.33 3.33 1.10 0.01 0.25 0.71 
L:HOLB 2011-3 -2.02 0.20 5.81 3.37 1.27 0.02 0.33 0.72 
L:HOLB 2011-4 -2.36 1.51 5.37 3.23 1.27 -0.06 0.31 0.72 
L:HOLB 2012-1 -2.60 1.28 5.11 2.33 1.27 0.02 0.32 0.72 
L:HOLB 2012-2 -2.34 1.33 5.65 1.73 1.27 0.03 0.32 0.72 
L:HOLB 2012-3 -6.78 1.31 5.24 1.37 1.27 0.02 0.33 0.70 
L:HOLB 2012-4 -21.94 1.70 6.52 1.27 1.27 0.03 0.35 0.70 
L:HOLB 2013-1 -21.31 1.96 4.24 1.47 1.27 0.01 0.35 0.70 
L:HOLB 2013-2 -21.48 2.04 4.54 1.77 1.27 -0.02 0.35 0.70 
 
Bank 
Name 
AFFIN 
HOLDINGS  Malaysia 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
L:AFIN 2004-1 -0.30 1.86 8.17 0.97 1.24 -0.07 NA 0.82 
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L:AFIN 2004-2 -0.53 1.91 7.95 1.13 1.24 0.00 0.06 0.82 
L:AFIN 2004-3 -0.53 1.80 6.37 1.43 1.24 0.00 0.06 0.82 
L:AFIN 2004-4 -0.53 1.99 4.85 2.13 1.24 0.00 0.06 0.82 
L:AFIN 2005-1 -0.60 2.25 5.96 2.43 1.19 -0.02 0.05 0.84 
L:AFIN 2005-2 -0.62 2.02 4.03 2.87 1.19 0.00 0.05 0.84 
L:AFIN 2005-3 -0.63 1.23 5.39 3.37 1.19 0.00 0.05 0.84 
L:AFIN 2005-4 -0.62 1.21 5.95 3.20 1.19 0.01 0.05 0.84 
L:AFIN 2006-1 -0.49 1.75 5.63 3.73 1.19 0.23 0.05 0.85 
L:AFIN 2006-2 -0.42 1.65 5.64 4.13 1.19 0.03 0.05 0.85 
L:AFIN 2006-3 -0.42 2.00 5.71 3.57 1.19 0.01 0.05 0.85 
L:AFIN 2006-4 -0.43 1.87 5.36 3.07 1.19 -0.01 0.05 0.85 
L:AFIN 2007-1 -1.06 1.03 5.16 2.60 1.08 0.10 0.05 0.82 
L:AFIN 2007-2 -0.66 1.17 5.94 1.43 1.08 0.02 0.05 0.82 
L:AFIN 2007-3 -0.65 1.17 6.44 1.77 1.08 0.00 0.05 0.82 
L:AFIN 2007-4 -0.69 1.20 7.57 2.20 1.08 0.01 0.05 0.82 
L:AFIN 2008-1 0.59 1.08 7.60 2.60 1.08 0.02 0.06 0.80 
L:AFIN 2008-2 0.68 1.14 6.62 4.83 1.08 0.03 0.06 0.80 
L:AFIN 2008-3 0.66 1.15 5.13 8.40 1.08 -0.02 0.06 0.80 
L:AFIN 2008-4 0.67 1.13 0.33 5.90 1.08 -0.06 0.05 0.80 
L:AFIN 2009-1 0.37 1.21 -5.76 3.70 1.08 0.07 0.07 0.76 
L:AFIN 2009-2 0.43 1.00 -3.74 1.33 1.09 -0.03 0.07 0.76 
L:AFIN 2009-3 0.40 1.03 -1.13 -2.27 1.09 0.02 0.07 0.76 
L:AFIN 2009-4 0.42 1.10 4.46 -0.17 1.09 0.01 0.07 0.76 
L:AFIN 2010-1 -0.52 1.32 10.29 1.27 1.09 0.20 0.09 0.72 
L:AFIN 2010-2 -10.05 1.37 9.37 1.53 1.10 0.05 0.10 0.72 
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L:AFIN 2010-3 -10.60 1.30 5.51 1.80 1.10 0.01 0.10 0.72 
L:AFIN 2010-4 -9.92 0.99 4.98 1.87 1.10 0.04 0.10 0.72 
L:AFIN 2011-1 -14.64 0.99 5.22 2.77 1.21 0.20 0.11 0.72 
L:AFIN 2011-2 4.66 0.74 4.33 3.33 1.11 0.01 0.11 0.72 
L:AFIN 2011-3 4.66 1.05 5.81 3.37 1.11 0.01 0.11 0.72 
L:AFIN 2011-4 4.41 1.88 5.37 3.23 1.11 -0.06 0.10 0.72 
L:AFIN 2012-1 2.17 1.79 5.11 2.33 1.23 0.07 0.13 0.71 
L:AFIN 2012-2 -1.06 1.65 5.65 1.73 1.23 0.03 0.13 0.71 
L:AFIN 2012-3 -1.16 1.62 5.24 1.37 1.23 -0.03 0.13 0.71 
L:AFIN 2012-4 -1.14 1.97 6.52 1.27 1.23 0.03 0.13 0.71 
L:AFIN 2013-1 -1.36 2.06 4.24 1.47 1.18 -0.10 0.14 0.71 
L:AFIN 2013-2 1.86 2.11 4.54 1.77 1.18 -0.02 0.13 0.71 
L:AFIN 2013-3 1.78 2.27 5.03 2.17 1.18 -0.03 0.13 0.71 
L:AFIN 2013-4 1.91 1.75 5.12 2.97 1.18 0.00 0.13 0.71 
 
Bank 
Name 
PUBLIC 
BANK  Malaysia 
       
BANK ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
L:PBOM 2004-1 -0.17 1.17 8.17 0.97 1.71 0.37 NA 0.63 
L:PBOM 2004-2 -0.30 1.09 7.95 1.13 1.71 0.00 0.10 0.63 
L:PBOM 2004-3 -0.30 1.11 6.37 1.43 1.71 0.00 0.10 0.63 
L:PBOM 2004-4 -0.30 1.22 4.85 2.13 1.71 0.00 0.10 0.63 
L:PBOM 2005-1 -0.37 1.22 5.96 2.43 1.54 0.13 0.11 0.67 
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L:PBOM 2005-2 -0.26 1.15 4.03 2.87 1.54 0.00 0.11 0.67 
L:PBOM 2005-3 -0.27 1.00 5.39 3.37 1.54 0.00 0.11 0.67 
L:PBOM 2005-4 -0.26 1.02 5.95 3.20 1.54 0.01 0.11 0.67 
L:PBOM 2006-1 -0.30 0.90 5.63 3.73 1.49 0.25 0.13 0.69 
L:PBOM 2006-2 -0.24 0.62 5.64 4.13 1.49 0.03 0.13 0.69 
L:PBOM 2006-3 -0.24 0.84 5.71 3.57 1.49 0.01 0.13 0.69 
L:PBOM 2006-4 -0.25 0.82 5.36 3.07 1.49 -0.01 0.13 0.69 
L:PBOM 2007-1 -0.29 0.88 5.16 2.60 1.53 0.32 0.17 0.68 
L:PBOM 2007-2 -0.24 1.19 5.94 1.43 1.53 0.02 0.17 0.68 
L:PBOM 2007-3 -0.24 1.20 6.44 1.77 1.53 0.00 0.17 0.68 
L:PBOM 2007-4 -0.25 1.10 7.57 2.20 1.53 0.01 0.17 0.68 
L:PBOM 2008-1 -0.28 1.04 7.60 2.60 1.59 0.17 0.22 0.67 
L:PBOM 2008-2 -0.21 0.52 6.62 4.83 1.59 0.03 0.22 0.67 
L:PBOM 2008-3 -0.20 0.58 5.13 8.40 1.59 -0.02 0.22 0.67 
L:PBOM 2008-4 -0.21 0.57 0.33 5.90 1.59 -0.06 0.21 0.67 
L:PBOM 2009-1 -0.21 0.61 -5.76 3.70 1.34 0.20 0.20 0.65 
L:PBOM 2009-2 -0.23 0.41 -3.74 1.33 1.34 -0.03 0.20 0.65 
L:PBOM 2009-3 -0.22 0.57 -1.13 -2.27 1.34 0.02 0.20 0.65 
L:PBOM 2009-4 -0.22 0.59 4.46 -0.17 1.34 0.01 0.20 0.65 
L:PBOM 2010-1 -0.22 0.62 10.29 1.27 1.49 0.05 0.25 0.61 
L:PBOM 2010-2 -0.24 0.88 9.37 1.53 1.49 0.05 0.26 0.61 
L:PBOM 2010-3 -0.24 0.86 5.51 1.80 1.49 0.01 0.26 0.61 
L:PBOM 2010-4 -0.24 1.09 4.98 1.87 1.49 0.04 0.27 0.61 
L:PBOM 2011-1 -0.25 0.93 5.22 2.77 1.60 0.03 0.31 0.61 
L:PBOM 2011-2 -0.28 0.82 4.33 3.33 1.60 0.01 0.32 0.61 
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L:PBOM 2011-3 -0.28 0.72 5.81 3.37 1.60 0.01 0.32 0.61 
L:PBOM 2011-4 -0.29 0.72 5.37 3.23 1.60 -0.06 0.30 0.61 
L:PBOM 2012-1 -0.34 0.66 5.11 2.33 1.59 0.15 0.34 0.61 
L:PBOM 2012-2 -0.66 0.65 5.65 1.73 1.59 0.03 0.35 0.61 
L:PBOM 2012-3 -0.72 0.66 5.24 1.37 1.59 -0.03 0.34 0.61 
L:PBOM 2012-4 -0.71 0.77 6.52 1.27 1.59 0.03 0.35 0.61 
L:PBOM 2013-1 -0.76 0.76 4.24 1.47 1.50 0.13 0.37 0.63 
L:PBOM 2013-2 -0.61 0.74 4.54 1.77 1.50 -0.02 0.37 0.63 
L:PBOM 2013-3 -0.58 0.72 5.03 2.17 1.50 -0.03 0.35 0.63 
L:PBOM 2013-4 -0.62 0.31 5.12 2.97 1.50 0.00 0.35 0.63 
 
Bank Name MBANK  Poland 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
PO:MBK 2004-1 9.30 1.53 7.55 1.61 -0.90 0.11 NA 1.10 
PO:MBK 2004-2 1.07 1.61 5.75 3.33 -0.90 -0.04 -2.43 1.10 
PO:MBK 2004-3 1.11 1.46 3.84 4.55 -0.90 0.06 -2.59 1.10 
PO:MBK 2004-4 1.17 1.05 4.50 4.44 -0.90 0.05 -2.70 1.10 
PO:MBK 2005-1 0.57 1.08 3.83 3.56 0.78 0.11 2.43 0.86 
PO:MBK 2005-2 0.78 0.97 1.83 2.30 0.78 -0.04 2.37 0.86 
PO:MBK 2005-3 0.91 1.08 4.42 1.56 0.78 -0.06 2.23 0.86 
PO:MBK 2005-4 0.84 0.51 4.32 1.08 0.78 0.02 2.35 0.86 
PO:MBK 2006-1 0.67 0.65 5.27 0.55 0.80 0.30 4.05 0.82 
PO:MBK 2006-2 1.21 0.64 5.87 0.81 0.80 -0.01 3.90 0.82 
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PO:MBK 2006-3 1.15 0.70 6.55 1.42 0.80 0.03 4.01 0.82 
PO:MBK 2006-4 1.26 0.29 7.07 1.34 0.80 0.01 4.07 0.82 
PO:MBK 2007-1 1.51 0.30 7.08 1.97 0.83 0.42 7.11 0.79 
PO:MBK 2007-2 0.95 0.40 6.91 2.41 0.83 0.01 7.42 0.79 
PO:MBK 2007-3 0.96 0.20 5.83 2.02 0.83 0.04 7.69 0.79 
PO:MBK 2007-4 1.05 0.84 7.28 3.50 0.83 0.04 7.97 0.79 
PO:MBK 2008-1 3.18 1.82 6.55 4.09 1.54 0.80 10.44 0.84 
PO:MBK 2008-2 0.92 2.13 6.05 4.33 1.54 0.10 11.56 0.84 
PO:MBK 2008-3 0.78 1.63 5.57 4.69 1.54 0.05 12.08 0.84 
PO:MBK 2008-4 0.69 1.83 2.75 3.76 1.54 -0.14 9.95 0.84 
PO:MBK 2009-1 3.36 1.64 0.57 3.26 0.27 -0.21 1.29 0.96 
PO:MBK 2009-2 1.13 1.54 1.05 3.72 0.27 -0.10 1.16 0.96 
PO:MBK 2009-3 1.12 2.22 1.14 3.54 0.27 0.08 1.22 0.96 
PO:MBK 2009-4 1.00 2.18 3.50 3.32 0.27 0.07 1.35 0.96 
PO:MBK 2010-1 0.57 1.96 2.53 3.01 0.86 0.08 6.14 0.84 
PO:MBK 2010-2 0.82 1.89 3.79 2.28 0.86 0.01 6.10 0.84 
PO:MBK 2010-3 1.08 2.18 4.81 2.19 0.86 -0.14 5.39 0.84 
PO:MBK 2010-4 1.00 2.05 4.26 2.89 0.86 0.15 6.14 0.84 
PO:MBK 2011-1 0.63 2.35 4.06 3.83 1.32 0.17 9.10 0.75 
PO:MBK 2011-2 1.06 1.35 4.44 4.57 1.32 0.04 9.73 0.75 
PO:MBK 2011-3 0.88 1.30 4.09 4.08 1.32 0.04 9.75 0.75 
PO:MBK 2011-4 0.93 1.10 4.65 4.58 1.32 -0.18 8.25 0.75 
PO:MBK 2012-1 1.19 1.19 3.76 4.12 1.40 -0.06 8.10 0.77 
PO:MBK 2012-2 0.90 1.30 2.29 3.99 1.40 0.10 8.98 0.77 
PO:MBK 2012-3 1.08 1.38 1.99 3.87 1.40 -0.07 8.29 0.77 
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PO:MBK 2012-4 1.01 1.54 0.98 2.87 1.40 0.05 9.16 0.77 
PO:MBK 2013-1 1.09 1.39 0.43 1.30 1.57 0.07 9.06 0.74 
PO:MBK 2013-2 0.96 1.17 1.16 0.50 1.57 -0.04 8.96 0.74 
PO:MBK 2013-3 0.99 1.15 2.17 1.07 1.57 -0.02 8.52 0.74 
PO:MBK 2013-4 1.03 0.12 2.30 0.72 1.57 0.08 9.25 0.74 
 
Bank 
Name 
BANK 
MILLENNIU
M  Poland 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficienc
y Ratio 
PO:MIB 2004-1 NA 0.42 7.55 1.61 1.23 -0.10 NA 0.79 
PO:MIB 2004-2 0.0032 0.53 5.75 3.33 1.23 -0.04 0.06 0.79 
PO:MIB 2004-3 0.0033 0.80 3.84 4.55 1.23 0.06 0.07 0.79 
PO:MIB 2004-4 0.0035 1.05 4.50 4.44 1.23 0.05 0.07 0.79 
PO:MIB 2005-1 -0.0001 0.87 3.83 3.56 2.70 0.36 0.19 0.68 
PO:MIB 2005-2 0.0000 0.69 1.83 2.30 2.70 -0.04 0.18 0.68 
PO:MIB 2005-3 -0.0001 0.85 4.42 1.56 2.70 -0.06 0.17 0.68 
PO:MIB 2005-4 -0.0001 1.89 4.32 1.08 2.70 0.02 0.18 0.68 
PO:MIB 2006-1 0.0028 1.68 5.27 0.55 1.29 0.34 0.10 0.82 
PO:MIB 2006-2 0.0026 1.48 5.87 0.81 1.29 -0.01 0.10 0.82 
PO:MIB 2006-3 0.0025 2.08 6.55 1.42 1.29 0.03 0.10 0.82 
PO:MIB 2006-4 0.0027 1.58 7.07 1.34 1.29 0.01 0.10 0.82 
PO:MIB 2007-1 0.0037 1.58 7.08 1.97 1.84 0.51 0.16 0.79 
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PO:MIB 2007-2 0.0031 1.57 6.91 2.41 1.84 0.01 0.17 0.79 
PO:MIB 2007-3 0.0031 1.60 5.83 2.02 1.84 0.04 0.17 0.79 
PO:MIB 2007-4 0.0034 1.47 7.28 3.50 1.84 0.04 0.18 0.79 
PO:MIB 2008-1 0.0046 2.33 6.55 4.09 1.30 0.66 0.18 0.81 
PO:MIB 2008-2 0.0030 2.19 6.05 4.33 1.30 0.10 0.20 0.81 
PO:MIB 2008-3 0.0026 2.25 5.57 4.69 1.30 0.05 0.20 0.81 
PO:MIB 2008-4 0.0023 2.15 2.75 3.76 1.30 -0.14 0.17 0.81 
PO:MIB 2009-1 0.0077 2.34 0.57 3.26 0.15 -0.20 0.17 1.00 
PO:MIB 2009-2 0.0111 2.28 1.05 3.72 0.15 -0.10 0.17 1.00 
PO:MIB 2009-3 0.0110 2.78 1.14 3.54 0.15 0.08 0.16 1.00 
PO:MIB 2009-4 0.0099 2.64 3.50 3.32 0.15 0.07 0.16 1.00 
PO:MIB 2010-1 0.0048 2.30 2.53 3.01 0.84 0.13 0.10 0.87 
PO:MIB 2010-2 0.0039 2.28 3.79 2.28 0.84 0.01 0.10 0.87 
PO:MIB 2010-3 0.0051 2.22 4.81 2.19 0.84 -0.14 0.09 0.87 
PO:MIB 2010-4 0.0047 2.20 4.26 2.89 0.84 0.15 0.10 0.87 
PO:MIB 2011-1 0.0040 1.80 4.06 3.83 1.08 0.11 0.13 0.84 
PO:MIB 2011-2 0.0038 1.41 4.44 4.57 1.08 0.04 0.14 0.84 
PO:MIB 2011-3 0.0031 1.46 4.09 4.08 1.08 0.04 0.14 0.84 
PO:MIB 2011-4 0.0033 0.77 4.65 4.58 1.08 -0.18 0.12 0.84 
PO:MIB 2012-1 0.0056 0.88 3.76 4.12 1.00 -0.08 0.11 0.86 
PO:MIB 2012-2 0.0045 0.96 2.29 3.99 1.00 0.10 0.12 0.86 
PO:MIB 2012-3 0.0054 1.07 1.99 3.87 1.00 -0.07 0.11 0.86 
PO:MIB 2012-4 0.0051 1.23 0.98 2.87 1.00 0.05 0.13 0.86 
PO:MIB 2013-1 0.0044 1.26 0.43 1.30 1.17 0.05 0.14 0.81 
PO:MIB 2013-2 0.0040 1.03 1.16 0.50 1.17 -0.04 0.14 0.81 
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PO:MIB 2013-3 0.0041 1.00 2.17 1.07 1.17 -0.02 0.13 0.81 
PO:MIB 2013-4 0.0043 1.50 2.30 0.72 1.17 0.08 0.14 0.81 
 
Bank 
Name 
BANK 
ZACHODNI 
WBK Poland 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
PO:BZW 2004-1 -0.81 0.51 7.55 1.61 1.74 0.18 NA 0.79 
PO:BZW 2004-2 -0.76 0.60 5.75 3.33 1.74 -0.04 1.56 0.79 
PO:BZW 2004-3 -0.79 0.52 3.84 4.55 1.74 0.06 1.66 0.79 
PO:BZW 2004-4 -0.84 0.92 4.50 4.44 1.74 0.05 1.73 0.79 
PO:BZW 2005-1 0.00 0.73 3.83 3.56 1.84 0.22 2.27 0.73 
PO:BZW 2005-2 0.28 0.47 1.83 2.30 1.84 -0.04 2.21 0.73 
PO:BZW 2005-3 0.33 0.42 4.42 1.56 1.84 -0.06 2.08 0.73 
PO:BZW 2005-4 0.30 0.35 4.32 1.08 1.84 0.02 2.19 0.73 
PO:BZW 2006-1 -58.88 0.82 5.27 0.55 2.45 0.19 3.32 0.66 
PO:BZW 2006-2 -3.72 0.84 5.87 0.81 2.45 -0.01 3.20 0.66 
PO:BZW 2006-3 -3.54 0.61 6.55 1.42 2.45 0.03 3.29 0.66 
PO:BZW 2006-4 -3.88 0.66 7.07 1.34 2.45 0.01 3.34 0.66 
PO:BZW 2007-1 8.76 0.67 7.08 1.97 2.59 0.35 4.39 0.65 
PO:BZW 2007-2 5.06 0.68 6.91 2.41 2.59 0.01 4.59 0.65 
PO:BZW 2007-3 5.11 0.60 5.83 2.02 2.59 0.04 4.75 0.65 
PO:BZW 2007-4 5.59 1.20 7.28 3.50 2.59 0.04 4.92 0.65 
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PO:BZW 2008-1 7.79 1.35 6.55 4.09 1.74 0.48 4.80 0.76 
PO:BZW 2008-2 0.86 1.69 6.05 4.33 1.74 0.10 5.31 0.76 
PO:BZW 2008-3 0.73 1.58 5.57 4.69 1.74 0.05 5.55 0.76 
PO:BZW 2008-4 0.64 1.22 2.75 3.76 1.74 -0.14 4.57 0.76 
PO:BZW 2009-1 0.54 1.22 0.57 3.26 1.60 -0.19 4.08 0.78 
PO:BZW 2009-2 0.56 0.95 1.05 3.72 1.60 -0.10 3.67 0.78 
PO:BZW 2009-3 0.56 1.04 1.14 3.54 1.60 0.08 3.85 0.78 
PO:BZW 2009-4 0.50 1.91 3.50 3.32 1.60 0.07 4.27 0.78 
PO:BZW 2010-1 0.47 1.84 2.53 3.01 1.83 -0.03 4.68 0.73 
PO:BZW 2010-2 0.41 1.80 3.79 2.28 1.83 0.01 4.65 0.73 
PO:BZW 2010-3 0.54 1.79 4.81 2.19 1.83 -0.14 4.11 0.73 
PO:BZW 2010-4 0.50 2.00 4.26 2.89 1.83 0.15 4.68 0.73 
PO:BZW 2011-1 0.05 2.19 4.06 3.83 2.14 0.14 5.47 0.71 
PO:BZW 2011-2 0.07 1.99 4.44 4.57 2.14 0.04 5.85 0.71 
PO:BZW 2011-3 0.06 1.83 4.09 4.08 2.14 0.04 5.86 0.71 
PO:BZW 2011-4 0.06 0.67 4.65 4.58 2.14 -0.18 4.96 0.71 
PO:BZW 2012-1 0.40 0.56 3.76 4.12 2.43 0.01 5.51 0.69 
PO:BZW 2012-2 0.23 0.48 2.29 3.99 2.43 0.10 6.10 0.69 
PO:BZW 2012-3 0.28 0.39 1.99 3.87 2.43 -0.07 5.63 0.69 
PO:BZW 2012-4 0.26 0.32 0.98 2.87 2.43 0.05 6.23 0.69 
PO:BZW 2013-1 0.01 0.32 0.43 1.30 2.45 0.75 6.72 0.74 
PO:BZW 2013-2 0.01 0.23 1.16 0.50 2.45 -0.04 6.65 0.74 
PO:BZW 2013-3 0.01 0.22 2.17 1.07 2.45 -0.02 6.32 0.74 
PO:BZW 2013-4 0.01 0.07 2.30 0.72 2.45 0.08 6.87 0.74 
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Bank 
Name 
BANK 
POLSKA 
KASA OPIEKI Poland 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
PO:PKA 2004-1 0.58 0.72 7.55 1.61 2.30 0.07 NA 0.74 
PO:PKA 2004-2 1.02 0.82 5.75 3.33 2.30 -0.04 2.06 0.74 
PO:PKA 2004-3 1.06 0.82 3.84 4.55 2.30 0.06 2.20 0.74 
PO:PKA 2004-4 1.12 0.93 4.50 4.44 2.30 0.05 2.30 0.74 
PO:PKA 2005-1 0.74 0.92 3.83 3.56 2.53 0.21 2.96 0.71 
PO:PKA 2005-2 0.89 0.92 1.83 2.30 2.53 -0.04 2.88 0.71 
PO:PKA 2005-3 1.05 0.72 4.42 1.56 2.53 -0.06 2.71 0.71 
PO:PKA 2005-4 0.97 1.26 4.32 1.08 2.53 0.02 2.85 0.71 
PO:PKA 2006-1 0.51 0.95 5.27 0.55 2.77 0.21 3.42 0.67 
PO:PKA 2006-2 1.05 0.92 5.87 0.81 2.77 -0.01 3.30 0.67 
PO:PKA 2006-3 1.00 0.74 6.55 1.42 2.77 0.03 3.39 0.67 
PO:PKA 2006-4 1.09 0.73 7.07 1.34 2.77 0.01 3.44 0.67 
PO:PKA 2007-1 1.31 0.80 7.08 1.97 2.27 1.04 4.12 0.69 
PO:PKA 2007-2 0.93 0.79 6.91 2.41 2.27 0.01 4.30 0.69 
PO:PKA 2007-3 0.94 0.73 5.83 2.02 2.27 0.04 4.45 0.69 
PO:PKA 2007-4 1.03 0.65 7.28 3.50 2.27 0.04 4.62 0.69 
PO:PKA 2008-1 1.59 1.22 6.55 4.09 2.86 0.15 5.51 0.70 
PO:PKA 2008-2 13.17 1.04 6.05 4.33 2.86 0.10 6.10 0.70 
PO:PKA 2008-3 11.15 1.25 5.57 4.69 2.86 0.05 6.38 0.70 
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PO:PKA 2008-4 9.84 0.98 2.75 3.76 2.86 -0.14 5.25 0.70 
PO:PKA 2009-1 21.20 0.97 0.57 3.26 1.89 -0.24 3.10 0.72 
PO:PKA 2009-2 1.08 0.92 1.05 3.72 1.89 -0.10 2.78 0.72 
PO:PKA 2009-3 1.07 1.06 1.14 3.54 1.89 0.08 2.92 0.72 
PO:PKA 2009-4 0.96 1.30 3.50 3.32 1.89 0.07 3.24 0.72 
PO:PKA 2010-1 0.92 1.22 2.53 3.01 1.96 0.04 3.38 0.70 
PO:PKA 2010-2 0.82 1.22 3.79 2.28 1.96 0.01 3.36 0.70 
PO:PKA 2010-3 1.07 1.13 4.81 2.19 1.96 -0.14 2.97 0.70 
PO:PKA 2010-4 0.99 1.37 4.26 2.89 1.96 0.15 3.38 0.70 
PO:PKA 2011-1 1.02 1.41 4.06 3.83 2.08 0.11 3.73 0.68 
PO:PKA 2011-2 1.02 1.32 4.44 4.57 2.08 0.04 3.99 0.68 
PO:PKA 2011-3 0.84 1.30 4.09 4.08 2.08 0.04 4.00 0.68 
PO:PKA 2011-4 0.89 0.81 4.65 4.58 2.08 -0.18 3.38 0.68 
PO:PKA 2012-1 1.17 0.76 3.76 4.12 2.00 -0.02 3.19 0.70 
PO:PKA 2012-2 0.89 0.78 2.29 3.99 2.00 0.10 3.54 0.70 
PO:PKA 2012-3 1.05 0.78 1.99 3.87 2.00 -0.07 3.27 0.70 
PO:PKA 2012-4 0.99 0.75 0.98 2.87 2.00 0.05 3.61 0.70 
PO:PKA 2013-1 0.52 0.76 0.43 1.30 1.81 0.09 3.36 0.68 
PO:PKA 2013-2 0.48 0.81 1.16 0.50 1.81 -0.04 3.32 0.68 
PO:PKA 2013-3 0.49 0.82 2.17 1.07 1.81 -0.02 3.16 0.68 
PO:PKA 2013-4 0.51 1.31 2.30 0.72 1.81 0.08 3.43 0.68 
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Bank Name FIRSTRAND 
South 
Africa 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
R:FSRJ 2004-1 1.21 0.72 3.15 0.44 1.49 0.05 NA 0.77 
R:FSRJ 2004-2 1.19 0.84 4.09 0.68 1.49 0.02 0.17 0.77 
R:FSRJ 2004-3 1.24 0.86 5.22 1.28 1.93 0.11 0.23 0.72 
R:FSRJ 2004-4 1.65 0.72 5.73 3.17 1.93 -0.06 0.22 0.72 
R:FSRJ 2005-1 1.45 0.75 5.21 2.86 1.93 0.15 0.24 0.72 
R:FSRJ 2005-2 1.26 0.83 5.63 3.18 1.93 -0.08 0.24 0.72 
R:FSRJ 2005-3 1.22 0.83 5.34 3.89 1.81 0.27 0.24 0.82 
R:FSRJ 2005-4 0.56 0.83 4.93 3.65 1.81 0.05 0.25 0.82 
R:FSRJ 2006-1 0.58 0.80 5.45 3.76 1.81 0.03 0.26 0.82 
R:FSRJ 2006-2 0.53 0.81 5.30 4.03 1.81 0.02 0.27 0.82 
R:FSRJ 2006-3 0.88 1.60 5.36 5.22 1.94 0.10 0.29 0.84 
R:FSRJ 2006-4 0.50 1.88 6.29 5.53 1.94 -0.09 0.27 0.84 
R:FSRJ 2007-1 0.46 2.15 6.36 5.94 1.94 0.13 0.29 0.84 
R:FSRJ 2007-2 0.49 2.03 5.45 6.99 1.94 -0.04 0.29 0.84 
R:FSRJ 2007-3 0.75 2.26 5.25 6.97 1.80 0.21 0.29 0.84 
R:FSRJ 2007-4 0.46 2.08 5.16 8.44 1.80 0.01 0.30 0.84 
R:FSRJ 2008-1 0.35 1.58 4.26 10.06 1.80 0.00 0.30 0.84 
R:FSRJ 2008-2 0.43 1.51 4.61 10.29 1.80 -0.12 0.26 0.84 
R:FSRJ 2008-3 1.05 1.52 3.80 11.18 1.14 -0.05 0.16 0.91 
R:FSRJ 2008-4 0.53 0.20 1.86 9.76 1.14 -0.08 0.14 0.91 
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R:FSRJ 2009-1 0.66 0.10 -0.50 8.38 1.14 -0.10 0.13 0.91 
R:FSRJ 2009-2 0.85 -0.03 -2.30 7.78 1.14 0.03 0.14 0.91 
R:FSRJ 2009-3 0.80 0.10 -2.30 6.42 1.32 0.13 0.23 0.80 
R:FSRJ 2009-4 1.07 0.25 -1.04 6.08 1.32 0.03 0.24 0.80 
R:FSRJ 2010-1 1.08 0.30 1.73 5.67 1.32 0.04 0.25 0.80 
R:FSRJ 2010-2 1.02 0.41 3.22 4.52 1.32 0.01 0.25 0.80 
R:FSRJ 2010-3 0.86 0.29 3.70 3.46 2.75 -0.25 0.49 0.76 
R:FSRJ 2010-4 1.25 1.12 3.96 3.45 2.75 0.11 0.54 0.76 
R:FSRJ 2011-1 1.19 1.14 4.08 3.83 2.75 0.05 0.55 0.76 
R:FSRJ 2011-2 1.22 0.89 3.83 4.63 2.75 -0.02 0.56 0.76 
R:FSRJ 2011-3 1.01 0.95 3.35 5.45 2.70 0.13 0.36 0.75 
R:FSRJ 2011-4 0.65 0.83 3.16 6.06 2.70 -0.18 0.30 0.75 
R:FSRJ 2012-1 0.76 0.63 2.51 6.12 2.70 0.02 0.30 0.75 
R:FSRJ 2012-2 0.53 0.62 2.66 5.76 2.70 0.05 0.31 0.75 
R:FSRJ 2012-3 0.54 0.37 2.53 5.10 1.90 0.10 0.32 0.73 
R:FSRJ 2012-4 0.43 0.26 2.17 5.65 1.90 -0.04 0.31 0.73 
R:FSRJ 2013-1 0.34 0.46 1.76 5.70 1.90 -0.01 0.31 0.73 
R:FSRJ 2013-2 0.18 0.56 1.91 5.65 1.90 -0.07 0.29 0.73 
R:FSRJ 2013-3 0.20 0.53 1.76 6.25 2.13 0.39 0.33 0.72 
R:FSRJ 2013-4 0.17 1.10 2.13 5.41 2.13 0.00 0.34 0.72 
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Bank Name 
NEDBANK 
GROUP  
South 
Africa 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
R:NEDJ 2004-1 1.08 0.34 3.15 0.44 0.55 0.14 NA 0.93 
R:NEDJ 2004-2 1.55 0.37 4.09 0.68 0.55 0.02 0.42 0.93 
R:NEDJ 2004-3 1.51 0.37 5.22 1.28 0.55 0.05 0.43 0.93 
R:NEDJ 2004-4 1.71 0.22 5.73 3.17 0.55 -0.06 0.41 0.93 
R:NEDJ 2005-1 1.86 0.33 5.21 2.86 1.36 0.30 1.58 0.86 
R:NEDJ 2005-2 1.93 -0.06 5.63 3.18 1.36 -0.08 1.57 0.86 
R:NEDJ 2005-3 2.41 -0.05 5.34 3.89 1.36 -0.09 1.41 0.86 
R:NEDJ 2005-4 2.21 0.09 4.93 3.65 1.36 0.05 1.48 0.86 
R:NEDJ 2006-1 1.29 0.37 5.45 3.76 1.36 0.27 1.86 0.82 
R:NEDJ 2006-2 0.96 0.38 5.30 4.03 1.36 0.02 1.88 0.82 
R:NEDJ 2006-3 0.92 0.77 5.36 5.22 1.36 -0.13 1.58 0.82 
R:NEDJ 2006-4 1.07 2.08 6.29 5.53 1.36 -0.09 1.45 0.82 
R:NEDJ 2007-1 0.82 2.52 6.36 5.94 1.50 0.35 2.09 0.84 
R:NEDJ 2007-2 0.59 2.34 5.45 6.99 1.50 -0.04 2.12 0.84 
R:NEDJ 2007-3 0.59 2.55 5.25 6.97 1.50 0.03 2.16 0.84 
R:NEDJ 2007-4 0.64 2.54 5.16 8.44 1.50 0.01 2.21 0.84 
R:NEDJ 2008-1 1.17 1.14 4.26 10.06 1.45 0.16 2.30 0.88 
R:NEDJ 2008-2 0.63 0.75 4.61 10.29 1.45 -0.12 2.02 0.88 
R:NEDJ 2008-3 0.62 1.40 3.80 11.18 1.45 0.01 2.05 0.88 
R:NEDJ 2008-4 0.50 0.36 1.86 9.76 1.45 -0.08 1.78 0.88 
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R:NEDJ 2009-1 0.96 0.26 -0.50 8.38 1.09 -0.06 1.22 0.90 
R:NEDJ 2009-2 0.90 0.17 -2.30 7.78 1.09 0.03 1.26 0.90 
R:NEDJ 2009-3 0.75 0.44 -2.30 6.42 1.09 0.15 1.42 0.90 
R:NEDJ 2009-4 0.71 0.58 -1.04 6.08 1.09 0.03 1.54 0.90 
R:NEDJ 2010-1 0.73 0.58 1.73 5.67 1.13 0.10 1.48 0.89 
R:NEDJ 2010-2 0.74 0.66 3.22 4.52 1.13 0.01 1.49 0.89 
R:NEDJ 2010-3 0.83 0.50 3.70 3.46 1.13 -0.06 1.42 0.89 
R:NEDJ 2010-4 0.81 1.21 3.96 3.45 1.13 0.11 1.58 0.89 
R:NEDJ 2011-1 0.81 1.09 4.08 3.83 1.28 0.10 2.01 0.85 
R:NEDJ 2011-2 0.96 0.84 3.83 4.63 1.28 -0.02 2.05 0.85 
R:NEDJ 2011-3 0.89 0.79 3.35 5.45 1.28 0.00 2.02 0.85 
R:NEDJ 2011-4 0.85 0.78 3.16 6.06 1.28 -0.18 1.71 0.85 
R:NEDJ 2012-1 1.18 0.82 2.51 6.12 1.40 0.09 2.01 0.83 
R:NEDJ 2012-2 1.00 0.80 2.66 5.76 1.40 0.05 2.10 0.83 
R:NEDJ 2012-3 1.17 0.59 2.53 5.10 1.40 -0.05 1.98 0.83 
R:NEDJ 2012-4 1.06 0.17 2.17 5.65 1.40 -0.04 1.89 0.83 
R:NEDJ 2013-1 0.11 0.67 1.76 5.70 1.67 0.10 2.18 0.82 
R:NEDJ 2013-2 0.09 0.75 1.91 5.65 1.67 -0.07 2.06 0.82 
R:NEDJ 2013-3 0.11 0.79 1.76 6.25 1.67 -0.09 1.85 0.82 
R:NEDJ 2013-4 0.10 1.10 2.13 5.41 1.67 0.00 1.88 0.82 
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Bank Name 
STANDARD 
BK.GP.  
South 
Africa 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
R:SBKJ 2004-1 0.42 0.99 3.15 0.44 2.60 0.22 NA 0.76 
R:SBKJ 2004-2 0.73 1.02 4.09 0.68 2.60 0.02 0.92 0.76 
R:SBKJ 2004-3 0.71 0.98 5.22 1.28 2.60 0.05 0.94 0.76 
R:SBKJ 2004-4 0.80 0.83 5.73 3.17 2.60 -0.06 0.90 0.76 
R:SBKJ 2005-1 0.77 0.86 5.21 2.86 2.89 0.48 1.15 0.86 
R:SBKJ 2005-2 0.58 0.75 5.63 3.18 2.89 -0.08 1.14 0.86 
R:SBKJ 2005-3 0.72 0.75 5.34 3.89 2.89 -0.09 1.02 0.86 
R:SBKJ 2005-4 0.66 0.65 4.93 3.65 2.89 0.05 1.07 0.86 
R:SBKJ 2006-1 0.94 0.57 5.45 3.76 3.38 0.39 1.42 0.86 
R:SBKJ 2006-2 0.32 0.52 5.30 4.03 3.38 0.02 1.44 0.86 
R:SBKJ 2006-3 0.22 0.94 5.36 5.22 3.38 -0.13 1.21 0.86 
R:SBKJ 2006-4 0.20 0.81 6.29 5.53 3.38 -0.09 1.10 0.86 
R:SBKJ 2007-1 0.51 1.20 6.36 5.94 3.38 0.63 1.53 0.83 
R:SBKJ 2007-2 0.28 1.62 5.45 6.99 3.38 -0.04 1.55 0.83 
R:SBKJ 2007-3 0.24 1.78 5.25 6.97 3.38 0.03 1.59 0.83 
R:SBKJ 2007-4 0.25 1.88 5.16 8.44 3.38 0.01 1.62 0.83 
R:SBKJ 2008-1 0.39 1.30 4.26 10.06 4.22 0.23 1.45 0.85 
R:SBKJ 2008-2 0.18 1.36 4.61 10.29 4.22 -0.12 1.27 0.85 
R:SBKJ 2008-3 0.15 1.43 3.80 11.18 4.22 0.01 1.29 0.85 
R:SBKJ 2008-4 0.06 0.46 1.86 9.76 4.22 -0.08 1.12 0.85 
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R:SBKJ 2009-1 0.42 0.41 -0.50 8.38 2.53 -0.17 0.81 0.88 
R:SBKJ 2009-2 0.51 0.24 -2.30 7.78 2.53 0.03 0.84 0.88 
R:SBKJ 2009-3 0.42 0.39 -2.30 6.42 2.53 0.15 0.95 0.88 
R:SBKJ 2009-4 0.40 0.38 -1.04 6.08 2.53 0.03 1.02 0.88 
R:SBKJ 2010-1 0.58 0.36 1.73 5.67 2.49 0.02 0.99 0.87 
R:SBKJ 2010-2 0.87 0.42 3.22 4.52 2.34 0.01 0.99 0.87 
R:SBKJ 2010-3 0.98 0.33 3.70 3.46 2.19 -0.06 0.95 0.87 
R:SBKJ 2010-4 0.96 0.61 3.96 3.45 2.05 0.11 1.05 0.87 
R:SBKJ 2011-1 0.99 0.56 4.08 3.83 1.88 0.17 1.29 0.85 
R:SBKJ 2011-2 1.19 0.57 3.83 4.63 1.88 -0.02 1.31 0.85 
R:SBKJ 2011-3 1.09 0.58 3.35 5.45 1.88 0.00 1.30 0.85 
R:SBKJ 2011-4 1.05 0.57 3.16 6.06 1.88 -0.18 1.10 0.85 
R:SBKJ 2012-1 1.10 0.54 2.51 6.12 1.19 0.04 1.30 0.83 
R:SBKJ 2012-2 0.66 0.48 2.66 5.76 1.19 0.05 1.36 0.83 
R:SBKJ 2012-3 0.77 0.38 2.53 5.10 1.19 -0.05 1.28 0.83 
R:SBKJ 2012-4 0.70 0.28 2.17 5.65 1.19 -0.04 1.22 0.83 
R:SBKJ 2013-1 0.16 0.77 1.76 5.70 1.95 0.02 1.20 0.82 
R:SBKJ 2013-2 0.14 0.73 1.91 5.65 1.95 -0.07 1.14 0.82 
R:SBKJ 2013-3 0.16 0.73 1.76 6.25 1.95 -0.09 1.02 0.82 
R:SBKJ 2013-4 0.15 1.07 2.13 5.41 1.95 0.00 1.03 0.82 
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Bank 
Name 
ALTERNATIF 
BANK  Turkey 
       
BANK 
ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
TK:ALF 2004-1 5.40 0.86 9.95 0.71 2.99 0.69 NA 0.81 
TK:ALF 2004-2 10.19 1.16 11.94 0.26 2.99 0.06 NA 0.81 
TK:ALF 2004-3 11.40 0.88 8.05 0.73 2.99 -0.09 NA 0.81 
TK:ALF 2004-4 11.93 0.91 7.99 1.29 2.99 -0.04 NA 0.81 
TK:ALF 2005-1 26.77 0.90 8.53 0.28 2.09 0.38 0.03 0.85 
TK:ALF 2005-2 -3.26 0.84 7.70 0.58 2.09 0.00 0.03 0.85 
TK:ALF 2005-3 -3.55 0.88 7.63 0.43 2.09 0.00 0.03 0.85 
TK:ALF 2005-4 -3.43 1.70 9.79 1.20 2.09 0.00 0.03 0.85 
TK:ALF 2006-1 -1.69 1.73 5.95 0.41 3.25 0.84 0.06 0.79 
TK:ALF 2006-2 0.78 1.80 9.74 1.19 3.25 0.00 0.06 0.79 
TK:ALF 2006-3 0.93 1.59 6.29 0.57 3.25 -0.13 0.05 0.79 
TK:ALF 2006-4 0.92 1.46 5.75 0.93 3.25 0.03 0.06 0.79 
TK:ALF 2007-1 1.99 1.53 8.10 0.78 4.48 0.39 0.11 0.75 
TK:ALF 2007-2 1.03 1.37 3.81 0.49 4.48 0.03 0.12 0.75 
TK:ALF 2007-3 1.01 1.35 3.18 0.11 4.48 0.06 0.13 0.75 
TK:ALF 2007-4 1.09 1.07 4.19 1.33 4.48 0.08 0.14 0.75 
TK:ALF 2008-1 -1.23 1.14 7.01 1.02 2.58 0.31 0.10 0.85 
TK:ALF 2008-2 -0.78 0.82 2.63 0.94 2.58 -0.10 0.09 0.85 
TK:ALF 2008-3 -0.79 0.92 0.86 0.26 2.58 0.05 0.10 0.85 
TK:ALF 2008-4 -0.62 0.84 -6.97 1.01 2.58 -0.04 0.09 0.85 
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TK:ALF 2009-1 -0.54 0.79 -14.74 0.35 2.11 -0.13 0.08 0.85 
TK:ALF 2009-2 -0.40 0.78 -7.77 0.26 2.11 -0.04 0.08 0.85 
TK:ALF 2009-3 -0.36 1.23 -2.77 0.11 2.11 0.04 0.08 0.85 
TK:ALF 2009-4 -0.36 1.14 5.86 1.40 2.11 0.03 0.08 0.85 
TK:ALF 2010-1 -1.66 1.12 12.59 1.29 1.32 0.16 0.04 0.90 
TK:ALF 2010-2 -3.91 1.26 10.42 -0.11 1.32 -0.01 0.04 0.90 
TK:ALF 2010-3 -4.16 1.01 5.28 0.38 1.32 -0.03 0.04 0.90 
TK:ALF 2010-4 -3.82 0.90 9.34 0.52 1.32 0.08 0.04 0.90 
TK:ALF 2011-1 0.43 0.98 12.42 0.52 1.25 0.25 0.03 0.95 
TK:ALF 2011-2 0.21 1.14 9.30 0.62 1.25 0.02 0.03 0.95 
TK:ALF 2011-3 0.26 0.41 8.74 0.36 1.25 -0.05 0.03 0.95 
TK:ALF 2011-4 0.36 0.60 5.26 1.86 1.25 -0.14 0.02 0.95 
TK:ALF 2012-1 0.34 0.71 3.13 0.51 2.71 0.19 0.09 0.89 
TK:ALF 2012-2 0.18 1.09 2.78 0.14 2.71 0.06 0.10 0.89 
TK:ALF 2012-3 0.21 1.11 1.54 0.45 2.71 -0.01 0.10 0.89 
TK:ALF 2012-4 0.23 1.43 1.40 0.91 2.71 0.00 0.10 0.89 
TK:ALF 2013-1 0.91 2.31 3.01 0.87 1.18 0.30 0.06 0.92 
TK:ALF 2013-2 1.07 2.28 4.57 0.44 1.18 -0.01 0.06 0.92 
TK:ALF 2013-3 1.07 2.22 4.19 0.33 1.18 -0.07 0.05 0.92 
TK:ALF 2013-4 1.12 2.15 4.46 0.76 1.18 -0.03 0.05 0.92 
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Bank 
Name 
SHAI.PUDONG 
DEV.BK. 'A'  
CHIN
A 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficienc
y Ratio 
CN:SPU 2004-1 0.21 1.36 
10.4
0 2.77 0.48 0.22 NA 0.83 
CN:SPU 2004-2 0.14 1.12 
10.4
2 4.40 0.48 0.00 0.02 0.83 
CN:SPU 2004-3 0.14 1.04 
10.3
1 5.27 0.48 0.00 0.02 0.83 
CN:SPU 2004-4 0.14 1.11 9.38 3.20 0.48 0.00 0.02 0.83 
CN:SPU 2005-1 0.30 1.14 
10.5
0 2.87 0.54 0.21 0.03 0.81 
CN:SPU 2005-2 0.29 1.01 
11.8
7 1.73 0.54 0.00 0.03 0.81 
CN:SPU 2005-3 0.30 0.79 
10.5
0 1.33 0.54 0.00 0.03 0.81 
CN:SPU 2005-4 0.29 0.79 9.63 1.37 0.54 0.02 0.03 0.81 
CN:SPU 2006-1 0.36 0.82 
13.1
1 1.20 0.59 0.25 0.03 0.80 
CN:SPU 2006-2 0.30 0.94 
12.2
3 1.37 0.59 0.01 0.04 0.80 
CN:SPU 2006-3 0.30 0.16 
12.0
9 1.27 0.59 0.00 0.04 0.80 
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CN:SPU 2006-4 0.30 0.12 
12.2
5 2.03 0.59 0.01 0.04 0.80 
CN:SPU 2007-1 0.18 0.76 
14.0
0 2.73 0.59 0.20 0.05 0.74 
CN:SPU 2007-2 0.20 0.82 
16.0
9 3.60 0.62 0.01 0.05 0.74 
CN:SPU 2007-3 0.21 0.98 
15.1
1 6.10 0.62 0.02 0.05 0.74 
CN:SPU 2007-4 0.21 0.97 
14.2
1 6.63 0.62 0.01 0.06 0.74 
CN:SPU 2008-1 0.16 1.04 
11.3
0 8.03 0.62 0.40 0.13 0.74 
CN:SPU 2008-2 0.15 1.03 
11.2
1 7.77 0.65 0.04 0.13 0.74 
CN:SPU 2008-3 0.15 1.18 9.79 5.27 0.65 0.02 0.14 0.74 
CN:SPU 2008-4 0.15 1.28 8.38 2.53 0.65 0.00 0.14 0.74 
CN:SPU 2009-1 0.21 1.16 6.50 -0.60 0.97 0.42 0.14 0.73 
CN:SPU 2009-2 0.24 1.22 8.72 -1.53 0.97 0.00 0.14 0.73 
CN:SPU 2009-3 0.24 1.28 
10.4
8 -1.27 0.97 0.00 0.14 0.73 
CN:SPU 2009-4 0.24 1.46 
11.3
1 0.67 0.97 0.00 0.14 0.73 
CN:SPU 2010-1 0.09 1.34 
12.0
1 2.20 1.05 0.14 0.18 0.68 
CN:SPU 2010-2 0.06 1.48 10.5 2.93 1.05 0.00 0.18 0.68 
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1 
CN:SPU 2010-3 0.06 1.46 9.47 3.47 1.05 0.01 0.18 0.68 
CN:SPU 2010-4 0.06 1.21 
10.5
7 4.70 1.05 0.01 0.18 0.68 
CN:SPU 2011-1 0.06 1.31 9.80 5.07 1.29 0.39 0.22 0.72 
CN:SPU 2011-2 0.04 1.17 9.69 5.73 1.29 0.01 0.22 0.72 
CN:SPU 2011-3 0.04 0.80 9.31 6.27 1.29 0.01 0.23 0.72 
CN:SPU 2011-4 0.04 0.72 8.84 4.60 1.29 0.01 0.23 0.72 
CN:SPU 2012-1 0.10 0.74 8.10 3.77 1.25 0.15 0.29 0.72 
CN:SPU 2012-2 0.09 0.70 7.71 2.87 1.25 0.00 0.29 0.72 
CN:SPU 2012-3 0.09 0.59 7.34 1.90 1.25 -0.01 0.29 0.72 
CN:SPU 2012-4 0.10 0.80 7.85 2.07 1.25 0.01 0.29 0.72 
CN:SPU 2013-1 0.32 1.41 7.70 2.44 1.28 0.05 0.35 0.72 
CN:SPU 2013-2 0.25 1.45 NA 2.38 1.28 0.00 0.35 0.72 
CN:SPU 2013-3 0.25 1.55 NA 2.76 1.28 0.01 0.36 0.72 
CN:SPU 2013-4 0.25 1.94 NA 2.90 1.28 0.00 0.36 0.72 
 
Bank 
Name 
QATAR 
NATIONAL 
BANK 
ALAHLY  Egypt 
       
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
EG:QNB 2004-1 0.52 1.64 4.27 14.40 5.67 0.09 NA 0.77 
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EG:QNB 2004-2 0.52 1.65 4.25 16.93 5.67 0.00 0.08 0.77 
EG:QNB 2004-3 0.52 2.01 3.86 16.87 5.67 0.00 0.08 0.77 
EG:QNB 2004-4 0.52 1.04 3.98 17.83 5.67 0.00 0.08 0.77 
EG:QNB 2005-1 -0.13 1.58 3.91 7.40 6.89 0.30 0.42 0.60 
EG:QNB 2005-2 1.57 0.61 4.47 4.83 6.89 0.03 0.43 0.60 
EG:QNB 2005-3 1.57 0.75 4.62 4.27 6.89 0.00 0.43 0.60 
EG:QNB 2005-4 1.57 0.92 4.93 3.10 6.89 0.01 0.43 0.60 
EG:QNB 2006-1 -0.15 1.05 6.09 3.70 6.75 1.56 0.04 0.84 
EG:QNB 2006-2 0.00 0.90 6.76 5.37 6.75 0.00 0.04 0.84 
EG:QNB 2006-3 0.00 1.13 6.81 8.97 6.75 0.00 0.04 0.84 
EG:QNB 2006-4 0.00 1.17 7.77 12.13 6.75 0.00 0.04 0.84 
EG:QNB 2007-1 0.00 1.13 2.43 12.60 1.56 0.21 0.06 0.81 
EG:QNB 2007-2 0.46 1.38 6.55 10.07 1.56 0.00 0.07 0.81 
EG:QNB 2007-3 0.46 1.31 7.59 8.60 1.56 0.00 0.09 0.81 
EG:QNB 2007-4 0.47 1.22 11.86 7.10 1.56 0.02 0.10 0.81 
EG:QNB 2008-1 0.25 0.86 5.92 12.33 2.27 0.02 0.36 0.70 
EG:QNB 2008-2 -0.17 0.95 12.45 18.77 2.27 0.01 0.36 0.70 
EG:QNB 2008-3 -0.17 1.03 14.23 22.37 2.27 0.02 0.37 0.70 
EG:QNB 2008-4 -0.16 0.95 6.60 19.60 2.27 -0.02 0.36 0.70 
EG:QNB 2009-1 -1.09 0.83 4.32 13.30 2.23 -0.07 0.36 0.68 
EG:QNB 2009-2 -0.95 0.78 4.61 10.63 2.23 -0.02 0.35 0.68 
EG:QNB 2009-3 -0.98 1.03 4.63 9.90 2.23 0.01 0.35 0.68 
EG:QNB 2009-4 -0.98 1.01 4.97 13.23 2.23 0.02 0.36 0.68 
EG:QNB 2010-1 -0.77 1.19 5.60 12.87 2.18 0.10 0.40 0.69 
EG:QNB 2010-2 -1.62 1.28 5.39 10.87 2.18 0.00 0.40 0.69 
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EG:QNB 2010-3 -1.63 1.14 5.47 10.87 2.18 -0.03 0.38 0.69 
EG:QNB 2010-4 -1.64 0.83 5.62 10.50 2.18 0.00 0.38 0.69 
EG:QNB 2011-1 -0.90 0.78 -4.33 11.00 2.22 0.09 0.42 0.70 
EG:QNB 2011-2 0.47 0.68 0.35 11.89 2.22 -0.03 0.40 0.70 
EG:QNB 2011-3 0.48 0.56 0.26 9.02 2.22 0.00 0.40 0.70 
EG:QNB 2011-4 0.47 0.68 0.40 8.57 2.22 0.00 0.40 0.70 
EG:QNB 2012-1 0.68 0.66 6.34 8.94 2.13 0.02 0.40 0.73 
EG:QNB 2012-2 0.17 0.54 2.22 8.11 2.13 0.00 0.40 0.73 
EG:QNB 2012-3 0.17 0.53 3.47 6.36 2.13 0.00 0.40 0.73 
EG:QNB 2012-4 0.17 0.58 2.46 5.20 2.13 -0.01 0.40 0.73 
EG:QNB 2013-1 0.06 0.56 2.19 7.36 2.41 -0.03 0.49 0.69 
EG:QNB 2013-2 0.07 0.62 1.47 8.69 2.41 -0.06 0.46 0.69 
EG:QNB 2013-3 0.07 0.61 1.04 10.06 2.41 -0.03 0.45 0.69 
EG:QNB 2013-4 0.07 0.61 1.44 11.70 2.41 0.02 0.46 0.69 
 
Bank 
Name 
COML.INTL.BANK 
(EGYPT) Egypt        
Bank ID Quarter CR MR GDP CPI ROA 
Loan 
Growth 
Rate EPS 
Efficiency 
Ratio 
EG:CIB 2004-1 0.14 1.68 4.27 14.40 0.02 0.11 NA 0.80 
EG:CIB 2004-2 0.13 1.87 4.25 16.93 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.80 
EG:CIB 2004-3 0.13 1.41 3.86 16.87 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.80 
EG:CIB 2004-4 0.13 2.04 3.98 17.83 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.80 
EG:CIB 2005-1 1.13 1.72 3.91 7.40 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.80 
EG:CIB 2005-2 1.13 1.04 4.47 4.83 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.80 
EG:CIB 2005-3 1.13 1.12 4.62 4.27 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.80 
EG:CIB 2005-4 1.13 1.26 4.93 3.10 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.80 
EG:CIB 2006-1 2.38 0.81 6.09 3.70 0.02 0.31 0.14 0.75 
EG:CIB 2006-2 2.38 0.04 6.76 5.37 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.75 
EG:CIB 2006-3 2.38 0.61 6.81 8.97 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.75 
EG:CIB 2006-4 2.38 0.46 7.77 12.13 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.75 
EG:CIB 2007-1 0.75 0.43 2.43 12.60 0.03 0.47 0.23 0.68 
125 
EG:CIB 2007-2 0.75 0.49 6.55 10.07 0.04 0.00 0.23 0.68 
EG:CIB 2007-3 0.75 0.51 7.59 8.60 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.68 
EG:CIB 2007-4 0.75 0.40 11.86 7.10 0.03 0.02 0.23 0.68 
EG:CIB 2008-1 0.34 0.62 5.92 12.33 0.03 -0.05 0.25 0.69 
EG:CIB 2008-2 0.34 0.84 12.45 18.77 0.04 0.01 0.25 0.69 
EG:CIB 2008-3 0.34 0.79 14.23 22.37 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.69 
EG:CIB 2008-4 0.34 1.08 6.60 19.60 0.02 -0.02 0.25 0.69 
EG:CIB 2009-1 0.53 0.75 4.32 13.30 0.03 0.13 0.31 0.67 
EG:CIB 2009-2 0.53 0.77 4.61 10.63 0.03 -0.02 0.31 0.67 
EG:CIB 2009-3 0.53 0.91 4.63 9.90 0.02 0.01 0.31 0.67 
EG:CIB 2009-4 0.53 0.86 4.97 13.23 0.02 0.02 0.31 0.67 
EG:CIB 2010-1 11.30 0.93 5.60 12.87 0.03 0.19 0.34 0.66 
EG:CIB 2010-2 11.30 1.10 5.39 10.87 0.03 0.00 0.34 0.66 
EG:CIB 2010-3 11.30 1.01 5.47 10.87 0.02 -0.03 0.33 0.66 
EG:CIB 2010-4 11.30 0.58 5.62 10.50 0.02 0.00 0.33 0.66 
EG:CIB 2011-1 0.44 0.79 -4.33 11.00 0.02 0.15 0.25 0.73 
EG:CIB 2011-2 0.44 0.80 0.35 11.89 0.02 -0.03 0.25 0.73 
EG:CIB 2011-3 0.44 0.72 0.26 9.02 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.73 
EG:CIB 2011-4 0.44 0.65 0.40 8.57 0.03 0.00 0.25 0.73 
EG:CIB 2012-1 0.30 0.66 6.34 8.94 0.02 0.00 0.39 0.68 
EG:CIB 2012-2 0.30 0.46 2.22 8.11 0.02 0.00 0.39 0.68 
EG:CIB 2012-3 0.30 0.49 3.47 6.36 0.03 0.00 0.39 0.68 
EG:CIB 2012-4 0.30 0.46 2.46 5.20 0.02 -0.01 0.39 0.68 
EG:CIB 2013-1 0.05 0.46 2.19 7.36 0.03 -0.17 0.52 0.65 
EG:CIB 2013-2 0.05 0.41 1.47 8.69 0.03 -0.06 0.49 0.65 
EG:CIB 2013-3 0.05 0.41 1.04 10.06 0.02 -0.03 0.48 0.65 
EG:CIB 2013-4 0.05 0.37 1.44 11.70 0.01 0.02 0.49 0.65 
 
 
 
 
